China is ahead of us in planning for its energy security – India can no longer be complacent.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh¹

CHINA and India are hardly energy ‘deficient’ countries. Both have impressive potential for renewable energy and large coal reserves which have historically met the bulk of their energy consumption. The problem lies in their recent economic boom, resulting in ever expanding demand for ‘clean’ and ‘efficient’ energy sources, leading to increasing dependence on ‘imported’ gas and especially oil. It is this ever shrinking global oil supply, complicated energy politics and vulnerable supply lanes that have since ‘securitized’ energy for Beijing.

Meanwhile, debates on the ever ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ of the understanding of ‘security’ in international relations have since evolved a new thesis where energy has come to be increasingly securitized and energy flashpoints projected as the focus of international politics.² It is in this context that China’s rise and its expanding energy deficit have resulted in Beijing resorting to more aggressive procurement strategies and tactics.³ These have obvious implications for New Delhi.

 

There are also scary national projections which threaten to take the slide beyond the power of political goodwill and technical efficiency. As per China’s Tenth Five Year Plan 2001-2005, by the year 2020, China is estimated to import about 500 million tons of oil and 100 billion cubic meter of gas to cater to its growing domestic demand. Thus, the share of China’s imports in its domestic consumption of oil and gas will rise to 72% and 50% respectively of its total consumption at that time.⁴ More conservative western estimates project China’s energy imports for 2020 at 30% for gas and 60% for oil.⁵ Especially in case of oil, where the total world production by 2020 is likely to reach 4 billion tons per day and the total share of available oil for exports will be 1.5 billion tons, China would have to procure the bulk of international oil exports to cater to its domestic needs. Meanwhile, global energy consumption is expected to rise by about 60% by 2020. With an expanding energy deficit, China will increasingly be drawn into fiercer global competition for energy resources.

In this evolving context of China’s growing energy demand and expanding stakes in global energy markets, this paper examines the nature and profile of China’s energy security and highlights its implications for Sino-Indian ties. Prima facie, given the rising energy deficit and physical proximity of these two expanding economies, recent years have witnessed heightened competition as well as growing activism in Sino-Indian energy parleys. The results though as yet remain mixed. With India’s energy needs expanding on similar lines, New Delhi has already begun to feel the pinch of China’s aggressive energy security strategies. These have not only contributed to the rise in global oil prices in recent years but also impinge on India’s perceptions and policies.

 

Like most stories on contemporary China, this one on China’s energy security must also begin with the transfer of power to Deng Xiaoping. Though China had begun energy export from mid-1970s, it was too modest to impact its ideology-driven politics. China’s energy policies therefore had no serious linkages to energy related regional and global developments of that time. Even watershed events like price fluctuations or supply disruptions of the early 1970s made little difference to Beijing’s energy policies.

It was only following rapid economic development during the 1980s and 1990s that China developed stakes in the global energy market. A first indication of this new thinking was a major reorganization of China’s energy sector during 1988.⁶ This reorientation of the energy sector was further hastened following China becoming a net importer of oil from 1993. This was further exacerbated when China’s domestic production failed to keep pace with the qualitative change in its rising domestic consumption.⁷ As a result, in addition to its domestic sector, China’s energy security strategy focused on its offshore energy assets, even promising joint development of energy in its disputed maritime areas like the South China Sea.

Since then, China has been on an overdrive for leasing foreign gas and oilfields and acquiring stakes in foreign energy establishments and joint ventures for ensuring energy supplies. It has also reoriented its procurement to more reliable pipelines from Russia and Central Asia rather than depend on volatile and US-controlled Middle East supplies through precarious Indian Ocean sea lanes and Malacca Straits choke points. As a result, the energy sector has emerged as an integral part of China’s overall maritime thinking and its naval assets form part of China’s holistic vision on energy security.⁸

China’s conventional energy security strategies had focused on (a) self-sufficiency in terms of exploiting only domestic resources, (b) emphasizing conservation and efficient use of energy sources, and (c) diversifying both the sources of energy as also the sectors of energy to maintain a reliable balance. By comparison, China’s energy strategy focus from the early 1990s has shifted towards ‘cooperation’ and ‘engagement’, including joint development, foreign direct investment and technology transfers as well as other innovative approaches towards alternative and renewable energy sources.

 

Second, China has also experimented with privatization of its best performing firms in the energy sector. These were first opened up for collaborations with major players in the field as also for stake-holding with the initial public offerings (IPOs) respectively during 2000 and 2002.⁹ This has since become routine in China’s energy sector. Indeed, signed after 12-years of negotiations in year 2000, a $4.35 billion petrochemical deal between China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the Royal Dutch/Shell for Huizhou (in Guangdong) remains China’s single largest joint-venture and the world’s leading petrochemical project so far.¹⁰ Indeed, such collaborations have lately come to be criticized for having made China (i) increasingly dependent on foreign suppliers, and on resources which are exhaustible, (ii) engage in serious competition with other major oil and gas importing powers, and (iii) be more concerned with ensuring safety of supply lines, thereby multiplying its stakes in global stability, security and order.¹¹ 

 

Chinese experts maintain that the problems of energy security are manageable and will not necessarily lead to international crisis. Nevertheless, studies focusing on the short and medium term indicate that China has failed to keep pace with the increasing demand for ‘clean’ and ‘efficient’ energy; and that, if continued, is likely to have serious security implications for both China’s domestic politics and for its foreign relations. China’s increasing oil deficit remains the one that seems least manageable of all. Though there may not be visible ‘energy-security-crisis’ as of now, yet the growing imbalance in China’s domestic demand for oil seems to have risen sharply (see Table 1). China’s oil consumption has doubled in the past 10 years and its car fleet (the main consumer of oil) is expected to expand to 267 vehicles per-1000 from less than 20 vehicles currently.¹² 

 

TABLE 1

China’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1980-2005 (thousand barrels per day)

Source: www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html Country Analysis Briefs: China

 

Apart from oil imports and reserves, outdated oil refining technologies add to China’s oil insecurity. It seems to have done precious little to either expand gas production or develop alternatives and renewable energy sources to deal with its expanding dependence on imported oil or mitigate security implications from its growing oil deficit. All this makes China’s energy security a more complex problem than indicated by a simple supply-demand analysis of its energy deficit.

 

There have been varying explanations of China’s energy security, and experts differ on several fundamental questions. They stress that China’s energy deficit is not a simple situation of ‘shortage’ of energy. Even today China continues to export energy, including certain kinds of crude and refined oil. It is the ever growing demand for clean and efficient energy, especially oil, that lie at the core of this energy security crisis in-the-making.¹³ For them, it is primarily a problem of structural adjustment where coordination and vision have been found wanting. China remains a typical example of a resource rich yet import dependent country because its energy policy has not kept pace with the changing nature of energy needs. Even in a clean and efficient energy source like gas, for example, China possesses abundant reserves of 53.3 trillion cubic feet.

The debate on why and how an energy deficit becomes a security threat in international relations remains inconclusive. Chinese experts believe that it is the nature of international politics that makes energy securitized. One author describes oil as ‘an important weapon of diplomacy, the blood of industry, life of economy, a guard against aggression, and, therefore, target of big powers.’¹⁴ As a result, security implications for the Indian Ocean region are not seen as flowing exclusively from China’s energy deficit but from the fact that most of China’s oil imports flow through the Indian Ocean sea lanes, regions ridden with turbulent politics. For example, the nature of threat projections around a scramble for oil has more to do with events like the two Persian Gulf wars that make energy the flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region. Of course, rising demand for oil imports only exacerbates these political skirmishes.

 

Given that four-fifths of China’s imported oil comes through the Straits of Malacca, speculation about this choke-point led Chinese President Hu Jintao to propound his ‘Malacca dilemma’ thesis, seen as a key element to China’s energy security vision.¹⁵ President Hu’s thesis is that the US has always encroached upon and tried to control navigation through the Malacca Straits. Consequently, Chinese experts have expounded both defensive and offensive options for a new naval strategy: ‘One [option] is making quick reactions, including military reaction, when a crisis occurs… to display the strength for safeguarding the country’s interests. The other is the capability of reciprocal deterrence. This means if you can threaten my international shipping route, I can also threaten your security in various fields, including your international shipping route security.’¹⁶ China has also tried to engage with other major players in the global energy market. In particular, China has focused on both inward as well as outward investments.

China’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have of late become aggressive in acquiring interests in oilfields and oil firms as also in inviting FDI in exploring China’s onshore and offshore gas and oil. Indeed, since developing offshore energy remains an expensive, high-tech and high-risk operation, this was the pioneering sector to open up to foreign enterprises. Nevertheless, this is a slow moving process, with several inbuilt limitations. In view of this growing interdependence, it is a strong possibility that China’s expanding energy deficit will cause at least some benign threats as it continues to produce large quantities of unclean and polluting energy resources. China’s widespread use of coal, for example, may cause acid rains and such man-made disasters know no national boundaries. Such issues may, in turn, become a major hurdle in attracting FDI and the resultant economic stagnation may create havoc, with a possible outpouring of Chinese populations to neighbouring countries.

 

China’s oil diplomacy has been marked by a new cooperative approach towards acquiring stakes in companies and oilfields overseas.¹⁷ Foreign companies are encouraged to acquire a stake and participate in China’s domestic and offshore energy fields; promoting cooperation and joint development of even the disputed energy fields. Recent offshore oil exploration efforts have been centred around the Bohai Sea opposite Tianjin and the Pearl River Mouth area which are believed to hold over 1.5 billion barrels of oil reserves. Starting from March 2002, British Petroleum has been developing Peng Lai drill in Block 11/05 from where commercial production is expected to reach 100,000 bbl/d. Similarly, Shell and CNOOC have been negotiating over the Bonan project in the Bohai Sea and CNOOC has already signed a production sharing contract with Canadian Husky Oil for the Wenchang find in the Pearl River Mouth where production is expected to reach 500,000 bbl/d. All this is aimed at building stakes of great powers to ensure peace in China’s immediate periphery.

 

Amongst other remarkable initiatives, after their boundary settlement agreement of December 2002, China and Vietnam have agreed to jointly develop Beibu Gulf (or Gulf of Tonkin). China has indeed gone further, with CNPC acquiring stakes in oil fields and production companies in Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, and Peru and Azerbaijan. Its most significant deal thus far has been the acquisition of a 60% stake in the Kazakh oil firm Aktobemunaigaz with a pledge to invest more in the next 20 years. Similarly, CNPC has acquired stakes in companies like Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company in Sudan from where oil imports have already begun to arrive as part of its investment deal. Russia too has emerged as a major focus of Chinese oil diplomacy. Feasibility studies to lay a pipeline between Anagarsk (in Russia) to Daqing with a capacity to carry 600,000 bbl/d of crude oil have been carried out. Indeed, China is now thinking of creating high capacity strategic petroleum reserves.

In addition, China has also tasked its naval forces to build capabilities and strategies to escort tankers as also protect access to SLOCs and ensure safety at choke-points. Chinese scholars no longer shy away from stressing the link between China’s military ability and its energy security imperatives.¹⁸ Whether the navy can ensure freedom of SLOCs and choke-points on high seas has become critical to China’s maritime thinking and planning.¹⁹ They often cite how China could face an energy crisis if its oil supply lines at sea were attacked, especially in places like the Straits of Malacca.

This has made SLOCs a priority issue on China’s security and foreign policy agenda for the 21st century. It partly explains China’s indulgence towards the littoral states in its immediate periphery, moving from South China Sea to the Indian Ocean rim. China is believed to have even evolved (or accessed) military facilities in some of these states. Among the main ‘target’ of China’s military engagement one could includes countries like Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Maldives, Iran, Sudan, South Africa, Tanzania and Tonga.

 

After prolonged anxiety about China’s energy procurement drive around the world and especially following several cases of China repeatedly undercutting New Delhi – especially its bid for the PetroKazakh Oil – India and China have begun to coordinate policies.²⁰ The two countries have since discussed launching an Asian counterpart of the International Energy Agency to coordinate policies.²¹ Their oil companies – the ONGC Videsh Limited and the China National Petroleum Corporation – created history by jointly bidding successfully for a 38% stake in PetroCanada’s operations in Al Furat gas and oil fields in Syria. It is the first China-India joint venture in a third country, and is appropriately called the Himalayan Corporation.²² Some of these initiatives at building a ‘strategic and cooperative partnership’ in the hydrocarbons sectors – especially relating to their biding for overseas oil reserves – were recently firmed up in an MoU signed during the January 2006 visit of India’s Petroleum Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar to Beijing.²³ 

 

This, however, does not preclude China from continuing with its buying spree which, even when not directly competing with or undercutting India, clearly impacts on India’s energy security. During January 2006, for example, China inked another deal with Myanmar to buy gas from its fields which are jointly owned by Indian companies. Note that Yangon did not even bother to inform India about this deal with PetroChina. India’s energy acquisition bids have not only been underbid by Chinese companies, its reluctance and cautious behaviour has sometimes facilitated China becoming the beneficiary. China recently managed to buy major stakes in Nigerian oilfields because GOI had shot down ONGC’s proposal to acquire a 45 per cent stake in a Nigerian oil and gas field for approximately $2 billion, calling it ‘too risky’ a venture.²⁴ 

Similarly, China has reasons for being skeptical about New Delhi. India’s nuclear deal of March 2006 with the US is the most debated recent event in this region’s energy politics. While several hiccups remain to be sorted out in this deal, China has already responded by offering eight nuclear power reactors to Pakistan. They will start commissioning them by 2015, to be completed within the next 10 years.²⁵ Though both India and Pakistan have enormous potential in nuclear energy, it can at best only make a small dent in their rising energy deficit. India, for instance, has an installed capacity of 3,310 mw and another 3,420 mw capacity is currently under construction.²⁶ However, this still constitutes only 1.8% of India’s energy consumption compared to 29% that comes from non-commercial sources like firewood, agricultural waste and animal dung, and rising scarcity and cost of these non-commercial sources may make that option unviable.²⁷ 

 

Another initiative that remains a cause of concern for the US has been the off-and-on deal for a $7 billion 2,700 km long Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.²⁸ India has also, starting from February 2006, become interested in another pipeline from Turkmenistan that is backed by the United States and is expected to be routed through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Meanwhile, India has also revived its partnership with Russia, and is an important investor ($2.7 billion) in the Sakhalin oilfield, with ONGC Videsh Limited holding 20% equity.²⁹ But India also continues to enjoy little success when it comes to neighbouring countries. In January 2006, for instance, Myanmar signed an MoU with PetroChina to supply 6.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas from Block A over 30 years – despite ONGC and GAIL holding 20% and 10% stakes. This highlights India’s concerns about energy becoming an issue with its immediate neighbours. This deal came to light on the eve of Indian petroleum minister’s visit to China which was planned to sign deals ‘to cooperate and submit joint bids’ for energy sources available in the international market.³⁰ However, this does not halt India from continuing its solitary explorations and it continues to participate in joint explorations in Myanmar (along with Daewoo of South Korea) and in the Bay of Bengal (with Russia’s Gazprom).³¹ 

 

To reiterate, it is not their overall energy profile but only a scramble for oil (and gas) which has the potential to negatively impinge on Sino-India ties. To appreciate how rising demand for clean energy may create friction between China and India, we need to look at the rapidly changing consumption patterns. For example, the consumption of natural gas in both China and India stood respectively at 0.5 tfc and 0.4 tfc 1990 and is projected to shoot up by 2020 to reach 6.1 tfc for China and only 3.4 tfc for India.³² This has clear implications for the nature of options available with India to deal with an energy deficit which may create newer flashpoints as China expands its access in the immediate periphery for reasons of energy resources as well for access and safety of SLOCs to procure energy from foreign suppliers.

Given India’s increasing import dependence on oil – expected to rise from 40% to 70% by 2010, and import of gas also reaching about 40% of total consumption – it is likely that rising demand will create a scramble for energy resources.³³ Like China, therefore, India is already finding itself under pressure to incorporate military means as part of the effort to ensure safety of its energy supplies, both in terms of dedicated suppliers or sources as also supply lines, especially SLOCs. Indeed, India is following a twin strategy of building bridges with the Chinese through confidence building measures, while at the same time strengthening its naval capability to ensure its energy interests. The creation of a tri-service command at Fortress Andaman clearly indicates the way India is responding to some of these trends.

Out of its total consumption of 2.0 million barrel per day, India’s net oil imports already account for about 1.2 million barrel per day. This consumption is projected to increase to 3.2 million barrel per day by 2010. Similarly, gas consumption has moved from 0.6 trillion cubic feet (tfc) in 1995 to 0.8 tfc in 2000 and is expected to rise to 1.8 tfc by 2010 and 3.2 tfc by 2020 when China’s is expected to reach 4.5 tfc. This will create pressure on both countries and reflect in their energy policies and strategies both between themselves as also vis-à-vis countries of the Indian Ocean rim.

 

Energy and foreign trade are two critical determinants for the peaceful and continued development of China and India. In the case of energy sources, new centres like Russia and Central Asia provide an advantage to China. India’s rise and its growing proximity to the US has made China particularly alive to protecting its access to these SLOCs even in the face of a potentially hostile New Delhi.³⁴ This explains China’s engagement with a range of countries where development projects and trade have been strongly backed up with military supplies, aimed at fostering a client-benefactor relationship of dependency.³⁵ But a scramble for oil has also created opportunities for cooperation and may lead to China and India working together in other related energy sectors.

China’s growing energy deficit, in the end, remains a complicated reality which can unleash both cooperative as also confrontationist tendencies in its foreign and security policies. Given China’s rising interdependence with the outside world, it must adopt a cooperative security strategy to obtain access to advanced technologies, energy supplies and ensure safety of its supply lines. However, greater insecurity on the part of the Chinese elite may generate more confrontationist tendencies. Therefore, the future of China’s energy security and its impact on Sino-Indian ties will depend on how both countries evolve cooperative strategies. Besides, the policies and practices of other energy deficient states in the region will also have a major influence in the evolution of China-India ties.

 

Interesting from the Indian point of view is that not only do most of the energy flashpoints seem to surround India in Southern Asia, the biggest new player in global energy markets – China – too happens to be its immediate neighbour. In the short term, China seems to be focusing on building bridges with other major players in the energy scene as also evolving alternative methods to exploit its traditional sectors like coal to generate clean energy. But even its coal reserves are soon likely to become problematic as the cost of new technologies for making coal clean, efficient and environment-friendly will continue to rise. Similarly, though the oil deficit does not make much difference to China’s rising demand for gas (where China has abundant reserves) it has the potential to unleash energy related flashpoints in its periphery.

All this has strong security implications for India where energy consumption is likely to grow much faster and the supply lines are bound to witness growing competition. The focus, therefore, has to remain on devising alternative and cooperative strategies for managing this competition, using available energy resources more wisely, and in exploring alternative and renewable sources of energy.

 

Endnotes:

1. Chietigj Bajpaee, ‘India, China Locked in Energy Game’, Asia Times, 17 May 2005, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ Asian_Economy/GC17Dk01.html

2. For details on how issues can be securitized see Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, (Cambridge: Cambriidge University Press, 2004); Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 1991); Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wielde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

3. Zha Daojiong, ‘China’s Energy Security: Domestic and International Issues’, Survival (IISS, London), Vol. 48, No. 1, (Spring 2006), p. 179; Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev, ‘China, Japan and the Scramble for Siberia’, Survival (IISS, London), 48(1), (Spring 2006), p. 164; Joe Barnes and Amy Myers Jaffe, ‘The Persian Gulf and the Geopolitics of Oil’, Survival (IISS, London), 48(1), (Spring 2006), p. 155.

4. See for example, Guojia nengyuan jieyue yu ziyuan zhong he liyong shiwu guihua (The National Tenth Five Year Plan for Saving Energy and Comprehensive Use of Natural Resources), Guojia jin maowei, November 2001 (National Trade and Economic Commission, November 2001), available at http://www.chinacp.com/newcn/chincp/policy-of-setc13.htm; Guojia Fazhan jihua weiyuan hui shiwu guihua zhanlue yanjiu xiache (National Development Plan Commission Strategic Study of the Tenth Five Year Plan), Beijing, Zhongguo renkou chubanshe (China Population Press, 2000), p. 531; Shang Weiguo, ‘Zhongguo shiyou: Shi guan zhan lue anquan’, (China’s Oil: A Issue of Strategic/Security Importance), Shijie Zhishi (The World Knowledge), 2002, Issue 21, p. 34; Wang Jian, ‘Zhonguo nengyuan de qangqi gongqiu xingshi’,(Long-term Situation of Chinese Energy), Zhongguo hongguan jinji xingxi wang (Information Network of China Academy of Macro Economics), 12 July 2001.

5. Erica Strechker Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security, RAND Paper MR-1244-AF, 2000, p. xi; World Bank, China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century, (Washington DC, 1997), pp. 20-21; also see http://www.phoenixtv.com/home/finance/fortune/200301/13/21660/html to compare these to earlier versions like those in Nigel Holloway, ‘For Whom the Bell Tolls’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 February 1995, pp.14-16; also ‘Business Briefing’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 October 1994, p.79.

6. In 1988 China reorganized most of its state owned oil and gas assets into two vertically integrated firms – the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec). Both were regionally focused and while CNPC controlled much of north and west, Sinopec controlled much of south. Similarly, while CNPC controlled much of crude oil production Sinopec controlled much of refining. Much of the offshore production – which has become the new focus – came under the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). Later, China National Star Petroleum was created in 1997 and State Energy Administration was created in 2003 and it is responsible for all the regulatory oversight.

7. Between 1990 and 2000, for example, China’s oil consumption doubled from 2.1 million barrel per day to 4.6 million barrel per day. The future projections of China’s oil demands for 2020 now range from 6.4 million barrel per day to 10.1 million barrel per day. See Amy Myers Jaffe and Steven W. Lewis, ‘Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy’, Survival (London), 44(1), Spring 2002, p. 117.

8. Swaran Singh, ‘China’s Changing Maritime Strategy: Implications for the Indian Ocean Region’, Journal of Indian Ocean Society, (New Delhi), February 1998.

9. CNPCs high performing subsidiary – PetroChina – had carried out IPO during early 2000 through both Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges and successfully raised over $3 billion with British Petroleum holding 20% of these. Since then several foreign players have been involved in China’s oil and gas fields. Amongst those involved in Bohai and Pearl River Mouth offshore fields (which have implications for Indian Ocean) include Chevron Texao from 1999, Philips Petroleum from 2000, Shell and Husky Oil from 2001 while Shell and Exxon Mobile have also been involved in pipelines projects.

10. ‘Shell Launches a Major Investment Project in China’, The Peoples Daily, 7 August 2002. Also for regular official details on this see China’s Petroleum Industry at http://www.vitrade.com/china/ chinanews_brieing_oil_industry.htm. CNOOC was set up in 1982 and currently has developed 19 offshore gas and oilfields. Its current subordinate companies include Bohai Sea Petroleum Corporation, the South China Sea Petroleum Corporation, the West Petroleum Corporation, the East China Sea Petroleum Corporation, over a dozen professional contract companies, and manufacturing entities and research centres and institutions.

11. Projections for 2020 amongst others are from conservative ones like Shixian Gao, ‘China’ in Paul B. Stares (ed.), Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), pp. 43-58 or PRC State Council, China Energy Strategy Study 2000-2050, (Beijing, 2000) to highest projections, for example, from International Energy Agency, China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security, (Paris: OECD, 2000); And for figures for 1990-2000 see ‘Asian Demand Flat, and May Get Worse’, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 30 July 2001, p. 2.

12. Peter Cornelius and Jonathan Story, ‘China Revolutionalizes Energy Markets’, Far East Economic Review (Hong Kong), October 2005, pp. 22-23.

13. Zhang Wenmu, ‘Zhongguo nengyuan anquan yu zhen che xuan zhe’ (The Energy Security of China and the Policy Options), Shijie Jinji yu Zhenzhi (World Economics and Politics), Beijing, Issue 5 (May 2003), p.11.

14. Xia yi shan, ‘Dang qian guoji nengyuan xinshi he zhongguo nengyuan zhanlue’, (Current International energy situation and Chinese Energy Strategy), Heping Yufa Zhan (Peace and Development Quarterly), 2002, Issue 2, p. 36.

15. A story from PRC owned-newspaper Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong) was reproduced at http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm527.shtml

16. A story from PRC owned-newspaper Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong) was reproduced at http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm527.shtml

17. Zhang Yirong, ‘China Quickens its Pace of Overseas Operations’, China Oil & Gas, Vol. 4 No. 3, (September 1997), p. 174; David B. Ottaway and Dan Morgan, ‘China Pursues Ambitious Role in Oil Market’, Washington Post, 26 December 1997, p. 1; ‘China Takes Control of Kazakhstan’s Aktyubinsk’, East European Energy Report, No. 69, (24 June 1997), p. 16; Ahmed Rashid and Trish Saywell, ‘Beijing Gusher, China Pays Hugely to Bag Energy Supplies Abroad’, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 26 February 1998, p. 48.

18. Zhang Wenmu, ‘Zhungguo nengyuan anquan yu zhen che xuan zhe’ (The Energy Security of China and the Policy Options), Shijie Jinji yu Zhenzhi (World Economies and Politics), Beijing, Issue 5 (May 2003), p.14; Pramit Mitra and Drew Thompson, ‘China and India: Rivals or Partners?’, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), April 2005, p. 32.

19. Liu Xinghua (and) Qing yi, ‘Zhongguo de shiyou anquan jiqi zhanlue xuanzhe’ (The Oil Security of China and its Strategic Options), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), Beijing, Issue 12 (December 2002), p. 27.

20. Laxman Kumar Behra, ‘China Deals a Blow to India’s Aspirations in Kazakhstan’, Energy Security, 19 January 2006, at http://www.iags.org/n0119064.htm

21. Anil K. Joseph, ‘India, China Plan Asia Energy Agency’, 13 January 2006, at http://www.rediff.com/money/2006/jan/13oil.htm

22. Soma Banerjee, ‘Unity Pays, Oilcos Learn at Their Cost’, The Economic Times (New Delhi), 7 December 2005, p. 23; ‘ONGC-CNPC bag Syria deal’, The Economic Times (New Delhi), 21 December 2005, p. 1; Siddhartha Varadarajan, ‘India, China and the Asian Axis of Oil’, The Hindu (New Delhi), 24 January 2006, p. 10.

23. ‘Aiyar Seeks Tie-ups with China’, The Hindu (New Delhi), 11 January 2006, p. 14; Soma Banerjee, ‘Indian Oil Cos to Explore China for JVs’, The Economic Times (New Delhi), 20 December 2005, p. 11.

24. ‘OVL’s Nigeria Field Plan Spiked’, The Times of India (New Delhi), 17 December 2005, p. 19.

25. ‘Pakistan May Buy Six Nuclear Reactors >From China’, The News, Pakistan, 4 January 2006 available at http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jan2006-daily/04-01-2006/main/main11.htm

26. Soma Banerjee, ‘The Long and Short of Energy’, The Economic Times (New Delhi), 7 October, 2005, p. 17.

27. M.R. Srinivasan, ‘Energy Security and the Search For New Options’, The Hindu (New Delhi), 2 September 2005, p. 10.

28. R.K. Pachauri, ‘Security India’s Energy Future’, The Indian Express (New Delhi), 4 August 2005, p. 9; also Amit Baruah, ‘A Test For India’s Foreign Policy’, The Hindu (New Delhi), 1 September 2005, p. 11.

29. ‘Russia Open to More Oil Projects: Aiyar’, The Hindu (New Delhi), 2 October 2005, p. 11.

30. ‘Myanmar Deals a Blow to Aiyar’s Oil Diplomacy’, The Times of India (New Delhi), 11 January 2006, p. 17.

31. ‘ONGC: Rich Gas Reserves in Myanmar Block Verified’, The Times of India (New Delhi), 30 December 2005, p. 10; ‘GAIL Begins Drilling in its Bay of Bengal Offshore Block’, The Times of India (New Delhi), 30 December 2005, p. 10.

32. For details on statistics see International Energy Outlook 2003 (Table A5) at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/tbl_5.html

33. G. Parthasarthy, ‘The Quest For Energy Security’, rediff.com at http://www.rediff. com/news/2001/jul/06gp.htm

34. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 275-312.

35. See for example, Happymon Jacob, ‘India-Sudan Energy Ties: Implications’, Observer Research Foundation, http://www. oberverindia.com/analysis/AO31.htm