‘Friends and enemies,’ said Kautilya ‘are born of circumstances.’ The end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar world provided the circumstances for India and the United States to change from political adversaries to strategic partners.

India began to flash on the American radar towards the end of the Cold War. In 1994, when the US was the sole, unchallenged superpower, Henry Kissinger was contemplating the inevitable decline of American power in the 21st century. ‘A new balance of power,’ he predicted, ‘would require the US to share its influence with Europe, China, Japan, Russia and probably India.’¹ By the turn of the century the word ‘probably’ had quietly been dropped.

The Americans seemed quite clear in reasoning why they desired a new relationship with India. In March 2000, on the eve of his landmark visit to India, Bill Clinton was presented with a brief prepared by the State Department under the title ‘Ten Reasons Why We Need To Engage India’.² These were briefly:

* To seek better ties with ‘an emerging global power and the world’s largest nation in the making.’

* Shared democratic values.

* To maximize the US partnership with one of the world’s largest economies.

* To help move India towards the global nonproliferation mainstream.

* To enhance joint efforts on urgent global issues like terrorism and narcotics.

* To work together to deal with challenges to regional stability.

* To protect the global environment.

* To join hands on global health issues like polio and AIDS.

* To upgrade US access to world class Indian players in the vital area of information technology; and

* To enlarge links in education, culture and people to people exchanges.

 

Unfortunately, a matching assessment of India’s stakes in the United States was missing. India responded, improvised and took policy decisions as events unfolded. The asymmetry in our respective approaches was soon exposed. The Americans were taking a ‘strategic’, i.e. long-term view of the relationship. India was fixated on more immediate and tangible benefits and hence responded in a ‘tactical’ fashion.

In particular, India was seeking a relaxation of proliferation-related sanctions so that cooperation could be meaningful in the nuclear, space and high technology sectors. After four years of intense negotiations, the Vajpayee government succeeded in extracting from the Americans what amounted to a Letter of Intent in the form of the Joint Statement of 6 January 2004, otherwise known as the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP).

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh then took the discussions forward and boldly moved to conclude the grand bargain that India had been seeking with the United States. While the Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 covered a wide range of important subjects, including defence, economic cooperation, energy, space and agriculture, the centrepiece was undoubtedly the agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation.

The Indo-US nuclear deal has profound implications on two areas of vital importance for India: the energy deficit and the overarching issue of national security. India is facing an energy crisis which threatens to slow down if not cripple its economic growth. According to the Draft Report of the Expert Committee on Integrated Energy Policy released by the Planning Commission in December 2005, India’s electricity supply will need to be expanded five to seven times of today’s consumption in order to sustain a growth rate of 8% per annum until 2031.

 

To meet this growing demand, India will face two equally unattractive choices. Power production can be increased either through more intensive use of our indigenous, low quality coal which will cause massive pollution, or by increased imports of oil and gas which will burn a large hole in our balance of payments. The long-term solution therefore points towards nuclear power, which according to the Planning Commission report ‘offers India the most potent means to long-term energy security.’ The prime minister has declared that India can produce 40,000 MW of nuclear power within a decade.

The performance of the nuclear sector has so far been disappointing. A total of 15 nuclear reactors yield approximately 3000 MWs of electricity – barely 3% of the country’s production. The scarcity of indigenous uranium, combined with the international nuclear embargo has prevented India from meeting even its modest targets of nuclear power. Unless there is a breakthrough in arranging fuel supplies from abroad, our nuclear power industry will soon be on life support.

Hence the critical importance of the Indo-US nuclear agreement. The Joint Statement binds the US President to approach the Congress to amend the laws and permit ‘full nuclear cooperation with India.’ Further, the US is to persuade its friends and allies (read the Nuclear Suppliers Group – NSG) to do likewise. Key NSG members like France and Russia have made it clear that nuclear cooperation with them will have to wait until the agreement with the US is implemented.

Beyond the promise of a bountiful and affordable source of energy, the July ’05 agreement has wider implications on India’s security and the future of its nuclear deterrence. By describing India as ‘a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology,’ President Bush acknowledged India as a virtual nuclear weapons state and a ‘de facto’ member of the exclusive nuclear club. It was a symbolic end to three decades of nuclear apartheid and technology denial imposed on India. The agreement committed India to separating its military and civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and placing all civilian facilities under international safeguards.

 

Few issues in India’s foreign policy have been as fiercely debated as the Indo-US nuclear agreement of July ’05. Politicians, strategic experts and scientists jumped into the fray, often reducing the discourse to the obscure technicalities of nuclear fission, fusion and fissile material. Supporters of the deal claimed that it would solve India’s energy problems and propel India towards a glorious future. Critics warned that it would compromise India’s security and entrap India in economic and technological bondage. As always, the truth lay somewhere in the middle.

There was intense speculation on whether the wide gap in the Indian and US negotiating positions could be bridged in time for an understanding to be reached during the visit of President Bush in early March. An agreement was eventually signed, after night long negotiations and nail biting suspense until the very end.

 

The India-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative announced on 2 March 2006 gave concrete shape to the agreement concluded in Washington in July last year. Under this, India has agreed to take the following steps: place 65% of its existing power reactors and those under construction (14 out of 22) under IAEA safeguards; place future thermal nuclear and fast breeder reactors under similar safeguards; and place the civilian reactors under safeguards ‘in perpetuity’ in return for US assurances that a life time supply of fuel for the reactors would be arranged.

The US, on its part, reiterated its earlier commitments, namely, that: The US Congress would be approached for amending the existing laws so that full nuclear cooperation with India could take place, and the Administration would approach the Nuclear Suppliers Group to end their nuclear embargo against India.

The scene of action has now shifted to Washington, where President Bush faces the formidable task of obtaining Congressional approval for the nuclear deal. Within a week of his return from India, Bush set the ball rolling by discussing the issue at the White House with key congressional leaders, including Senator Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). The Administration also submitted the amendments required in the Atomic Energy Act, which need to be voted in both the SFRC and the House Foreign Relations Committee (HFRC) before reaching the floor of Congress.

President Bush has started early because he is aware of the tight timelines for the India bill. The committees will need to approve the amendments by May so that Congress can vote on them before heading for elections in November. Any delay by the committees will make the bill die a natural death, as there will be a virtual stampede for passing other pending legislation.

The nuclear deal with India has already drawn fire from the so-called Ayatollahs of nonproliferation as well as from liberal Congressmen like Ed Markey of Massachusetts. Many fear that a lame duck president, bruised by a faltering war in Iraq and faced with domestic opposition on other issues, may not be able to push the legislation through Congress. It is too early to draw such a conclusion. The Ayatollahs (like their Indian counterparts) have received wide media coverage and support, but have failed to stall the process. For all his flaws, Bush is known for the courage of his convictions. He will no doubt mobilise all the assets at his disposal to ensure that the Indo-US partnership is protected. It should not be forgotten that the president’s Republican Party enjoys a majority in both houses of Congress.

 

The preoccupation of the media with the nuclear issue has diverted attention from other important areas of cooperation with the United States. The Joint Statement of 2 March underlined the progress achieved in other areas like energy and environment, defence, agriculture, science and technology and economic exchanges.

The energy dialogue has acquired a prominent place in the strategic partnership. Apart from nuclear energy cooperation, the two sides agreed on India’s participation in Future-Gen, a project which will help develop viable ‘clean coal and zero emission’ power projects. India and the US are already engaged in research on hydrogen energy and coal bed methane. In the field of the environment, the focus will be on regional cooperation through the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.

 

Defence cooperation, which was of a token nature during the five decades of the Cold War, has now moved to the centre of the relationship; especially after the conclusion of the ten year framework for the Indo-US Defence Relationship concluded in 2005. After more than 30 joint exercises in the past four years, the armed forces on both sides have acquired a sense of confidence in their inter-operability. It is also significant that India is now being offered almost the entire range of advanced US military technology: from F-16 and F-18 aircraft to the futuristic PAC-3 anti-missile system, the F/A-22 and F-35 fighters and the P-8A multi-mission maritime aircraft.

In agriculture, a sector of particular interest to the prime minister, the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture will bring the latest research to the Indian farmer, heralding a second green revolution. In science and technology a new instrument of cooperation has been announced: the bi-national Science and Technology Commission. Cooperation in space is moving ahead, especially through space exploration, satellite navigation and earth sciences.

On the economic front, Prime Minister Singh and President Bush agreed to give serious consideration to the suggestions given by the 20 member CEOs forum set up last year. This includes the recommendation for a new $5 billion Infrastructure Development Fund.

Indo-US relations have acquired a high momentum over the past five years and much of the credit must go to George W. Bush. He challenged the conventional wisdom of the pundits in Washington and made India the centrepiece of his ‘Transformational Diplomacy’. Notwithstanding murmurs of disapproval from the Ayatollahs, Bush has drummed up bipartisan support for India being considered a principal strategic partner for the United States in the 21st century.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has also recognized the centrality of the United States in India’s foreign policy. However, the vocal opposition of his Communist allies and the lukewarm support from his own party have weakened his hands. His biggest challenge is therefore to build up a strong political consensus within the country after addressing the doubts and misgivings which continue to be expressed on the Indo-US partnership.

 

The most widespread concern amongst critics is that the new relationship with the United States has happened too fast for India’s comfort. India, it is argued, must proceed with caution and avoid being converted into a satellite or regional surrogate of the United States.

Such a perception is unfortunate, as it assumes that India is a passive and pliable nation, unable to take autonomous decisions in foreign policy. Whether it is a country that cannot say ‘No’ to a bigger power at critical moments can be examined from its record.

India turned down the United States at the beginning of the Cold War when the West was scouting for allies to fight international communism. India said ‘No’ to the Soviet Union when it was invited by Brezhnev to join the Asian Collective Security Pact. In 1974 and 1998, India defied the big powers collectively and conducted nuclear tests. India said ‘No’ three years ago to an American request for sending troops to Iraq.

 

A proud country like India finds it more difficult to say ‘Yes’ rather than ‘No’ to a big power. Yet, there have been notable exceptions. In 1971, Indira Gandhi faced a dilemma when the Soviet Union proposed a political and security partnership. The Chinese invasion of 1962 had exposed India’s global isolation, as much as its military and economic weakness. The Soviet offer, while welcome, raised disturbing issues: betrayal of nonalignment, surrender of sovereignty and the possibility of internal subversion. Indira Gandhi brushed aside these concerns and went ahead in forging a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union. Few will contest that this partnership has served India’s interests well for three decades.

A parallel can be drawn with today’s situation. The US has proposed a strategic partnership that is far more comprehensive than anything the Soviet Union had offered in 1971 and once again the Indian leadership has to accept it with boldness and conviction. The process begins by acknowledging that the United States is today more important than any other country for fulfilling India’s national aspirations, and is likely to remain so for the next three to five decades.

Offered below are my ‘Ten Reasons Why India Needs To Engage The United States’:

1. More investments: With a GDP of $12.5 trillion, the US is an economic giant whose wealth is equal to the combined GDP of the seven other members of the G8. It is also the world’s largest source of investments. India needs to attract $150 billion in investments in the infrastructure sector alone within the next 5 to 10 years.

2. Higher trade: The US is the world’s largest trader as also India’s single largest trading partner. Yet Indo-US trade last year was $22 billion as compared to $142 billion of US-China trade. Our current goal is to reach a bilateral trade level of $40 billion by 2008, still modest as compared to China.

3. Access to high technology: Over 40% of the world’s advanced technology is controlled by the United States. India urgently needs access to superior technology especially in biotech, infotech, nanotech and agrotech.

4. Energy security: India’s energy deficit – estimated currently at 100,000 MWs – is already raising doubts about the country’s ability to achieve 8-10% GDP growth in the coming years.

 

In his State of the Union Address on 1 February 2006, President Bush spoke about the American addiction to imported oil and announced the Advanced Energy Initiative, under which the US will replace 75% of its oil imports by 2025. An energy partnership with the US will be beneficial for India, especially for accessing the most promising source of power in the future: nuclear energy.

5. Fighting international terrorism: Both India and the US are in the crosshairs of the international terrorist networks. The US is the only power that has the resources and the will to fight terrorism to a finish, even though its leadership has made serious misjudgements in the past and has acted in an erratic fashion.

6. Access to advanced military technology: The Cold War obliged India to be excessively dependent on the military hardware produced by the Soviet Union and its socialist allies. Today, India needs to replenish its armoury with state-of-the-art military technology. There is no better source for this than the United States.

7. Balancing China: India’s relations with China have improved significantly since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988. Yet, misgivings remain in the Indian mind about some aspects of China’s policies which adversely affect its security. These include the Chinese transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan and Iran and the ring of military facilities that China is reportedly constructing in India’s neighbourhood, including Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

 

The US has raised concerns in public about China’s feverish military expansion since 1996 and the double-digit growth of its budget in the past ten years. The Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) published in February 2006 identifies China as the principal military threat in the future for the US and for regional military balances. India and the US have a common interest, not in containing China, but in keeping a wary eye on Chinese activities which could affect their security and the security of the region.

8. Reforming the UN: It is unfortunate that the US, a founding member of the UN and its principal financial contributor, is being perceived today as the main detractor of the UN system. India needs to persuade the US to join the international community in reforming and strengthening the United Nations. India also needs US support for its aspiration to join the UN Security Council as a permanent member.

9. Keeping peace in the neighbourhood: During the Cold War it was India’s official policy to keep the big powers, particularly the United States, away from South Asia. Today, Indian and US officials meet on a regular basis to share their perspectives on developments in the region and coordinate their policies.

 

Cooperation with the United States has promoted India’s interests in the neighbourhood. Much of Pakistan’s capacity for trouble has been neutralized, largely due to changed US policy on Pakistan. During Bill Clinton’s visit to South Asia in 2000, the US affirmed the sanctity of the LoC in Kashmir and took a firm line against cross-border terrorism. The US is no longer orchestrating the strident criticism of human rights abuses in J&K or calling for implementing old UN resolutions. It is an active facilitator in the current peace process with Pakistan. India and the US have also been consulting each other with regard to India’s other neighbours – Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

10. A global role for India: Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose had remarked that he did not know a single instance where a country won freedom without some help from outside. By the same logic, there is hardly a country which has achieved global eminence without outside help. Britain, France and Germany were major beneficiaries of massive economic and security assistance from the United States after the Second World War. So was Japan. China’s strength was enhanced in the early Cold War period through its partnership with the Soviet Union, and later with America when it split with Moscow. The US offer of assisting India to become a global power should therefore be taken in the right spirit.

The prime minister has stated in Parliament that India is on the threshold of unprecedented opportunities. The new relationship with the US is one of them. The challenge for the government, therefore, is to go beyond tactical considerations and seize the US offer of strategic partnership – on India’s terms.

 

Footnotes:

1. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, 1994.

2. Karl F. Inderfurth, ‘Ten Steps to the Future’, India Abroad, 16 December 2005.