THE two planes that brought down the twin towers did much more than kill thousands of innocent people. They categorically changed the US’s relationship with the world and its foreign policy. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the country came together in a very positive way. The tragedy united the nation, engaging people who had previously been disconnected or alienated from the political system, especially after the 2000 presidential election. Public grief was followed by anger and a demand for security. It was critical that President Bush retaliate in some way for the 9/11 attack. He responded by declaring a ‘war on terror’.

The American people gave the President a blanket mandate to take whatever action he felt was necessary. The Bush administration took the backing of the country and put in place an aggressive policy of pre-emption. The neocons, led by Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld and Cheney, decided that the only way to prevent another attack was to take the war to the terrorists’ backyard. They adopted the stand that it was better to be feared than to be loved.

The policy of pre-emption was and remains highly controversial. Afghanistan was the first target of this initiative. Despite the fact that none of the hijackers were Afghans, on 12 December 2001 the US invaded Afghanistan. The main justification was that the Taliban had played host to Osama Bin Laden.

In a speech on 15 September 2001 President Bush declared that the US ‘will not only deal with [terrorists] who dare attack America, we will deal with those who harbour them and feed them. Make no mistake about it: under our tears is the strong determination of America to win this war.’ The world, sympathetic to the US in the aftermath of 9/11, was willing to give the President the benefit of doubt. Many accepted his decision as ‘preventative’, which under international law is recognized as a legitimate form of self defence. Most of the world viewed the Taliban negatively and removing them seemed like a worthwhile objective.

The Bush administration had three main objectives in Afghanistan. The first was to capture Osama Bin Laden, the second was to replace the Taliban with a government friendly to the US, and the third was to introduce democracy to Afghanistan.

 

The mission in Afghanistan fell short of these goals. Osama Bin Laden eluded capture and Afghanistan has returned to its pre-Taliban status where the warlords control the countryside. Although the Taliban were driven from the country, they are still active. They melted into the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan from where they continue to threaten the fledgling democratic experiment in Afghanistan. Drug trafficking, which had all but disappeared under the religious Taliban has resumed. Security remains a huge problem, and although it is not nearly as bad as Iraq, it is far from being a stable country. Corruption has slowed the pace of reconstruction and many aid workers still don’t feel that it is safe enough for them to return.

Without completing what they set out to achieve in Afghanistan, the Bush administration shifted its focus and resources and decided to invade Iraq. They went to the UN to get approval, but failed. Many countries, including some of their European allies, opposed them. The Bush team went into overdrive trying to link 9/11 with Iraq claiming that it was a preventative act. There was no clear evidence given to support this claim – none of the hijackers were Iraqi, Al Qaeda was not a presence in Iraq, and Saddam Hussein had never allowed religious groups to have any power in his country. He was not an exporter of Islamic fundamentalists, and did not tolerate them in Iraq.

The ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ theory was put forward, bolstered by what we now know was at least a manipulation of facts and, at worst, a falsification of them. El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency and recipient of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize, ran afoul of the Bush administration when he refused to endorse their claim that Saddam Hussein had rebuilt a nuclear programme. To this date, no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq.

The 250 billion dollar question is: why did this administration really invade Iraq? Richard Haas, who worked at the State Department and now heads the Council of Foreign Relations, is quoted as saying he will go to his grave not knowing the answer to this question.

 

The White House’s official response is that they suspected the existence of WMD in Iraq. However, even if this suspicion had been confirmed, it was far from being a direct threat to the US. Saddam was certainly a threat to his neighbours – both Kuwait and Iran had suffered at his hands – but he had never directly threatened the US. Furthermore, if the Bush administration truly believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, as the French kept on pointing out, diplomacy and sanctions should have been used to bring Saddam down.

Another reason the White House bandied about was the urgency of bringing democracy to the Middle East. It was argued that Islamic fundamentalism germinated in societies dominated by dictators. In Iraq, Saddam had become increasing unpopular among his people. Sanctions had put a huge strain on the economy, making him weak and an easy target to overthrow. Thus, Iraq seemed like a good place to test this theory.

 

Among the more plausible explanations was the slow realization by the administration of the fragility of the Saudi enterprise. Saudi Arabia sits on the world’s largest known reserves of oil. It is the world’s largest net exporter of oil, and the US is the world’s largest consumer. Oil production in the US is decreasing, while consumption is increasing. 15% of US oil imports come from Saudi Arabia which has the capacity to triple its production. Since the early 1930s, the United States had always assumed that Saudi oil was its for the asking (and paying). The US’s favoured source of supply was taken for granted. This expectation was secure as long as the Royal House of Saud remained in power. The relationship became even more important after the Shah, the US’s other friend in the Middle East, was deposed and oil imports from Iran ceased.

Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia has no democracy, suppresses its women, and exports and finances Islamic fundamentalists, the administration considers them its best friend in the region, second only to Israel. The US has chosen to turn a blind eye to the inequities in the kingdom as long as the oil keeps flowing. The Faustian pact has been made, and it is in the interest of the US government that this repressive regime remain in power. This shortsighted policy has now come to haunt them.

By protecting the Saudi dictators, the US allowed them free reign to use the oil beneath their feet to enhance their personal wealth at the expense of the Saudi people. Much of the oil in Saudi Arabia is in the Shiite east. The Shiites, however, have been excluded from working in the oil industry. Roughly 2,000 members of the Royal family are supported by this oil wealth, just because they are part of the Royal family. This is particularly galling to many given the 25% unemployment rate. The combination of frustrated expectations, a disenfranchised youth and the unwillingness of the regime to reform, has created an explosive situation. Osama Bin Laden has always said his primary target was the House of Saud. His hate for America was based on its collaboration with the Saudi regime.

9/11 was the rude awakening. Fifteen of the hijackers were Saudi. Osama Bin Laden was Saudi. Al Qaeda was primarily Saudi. This was contrary to the conventional image one had of the post-1950 Saudi. Generally, they were viewed as rich, spoilt, with a penchant for shopping at Harrods and mistreating their housekeepers. Suicide bombers and terrorists was not what came to mind. The rot in the Kingdom had begun to smell, and it set off alarms in the US government. If Saudi Arabia was politically unstable and the Royal Family was vulnerable the US would need a backup plan. Iraq was it. One can safely assume that if there was no oil in Iraq, it would not have been invaded.

 

The last explanation, and the most worrying, is that the invasion of Iraq was part of a plan by the neocons to remake the Middle East. The neocons are overwhelmingly pro-Israel and their primary objective has always been Israel’s security. Many believe that the decision to invade Iraq was made well before 9/11. As early as 1996, a policy paper entitled ‘Operation Clean Break’ was circulated. Its authors included Richard Perle, one of the President’s chief military advisors and Dough Feith, who later became Bush’s Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. Vice President Cheney was also one of its adherents.

 

At the time, it scandalized many foreign policy insiders. The paper argued that Israel would never be secure unless the dictators on its eastern flank were removed or weakened. The neocons talked about ‘draining the swamp’, referring to countries which supported terrorists. The paper advocated the removal of the heads of state of Syria and Iraq, and giving Iraq to the Hashemite (Jordan). The British had already tried this in 1921 with disastrous results. After the First World War, the Hashemite, who were from Mecca, were installed by the British as rulers of Iraq. However, after a chequered history of assassinations and chaos, they were overthrown.

Although we can never be sure what the real reason was for invading Iraq, what we now do know is that the occupation has not gone well. On 1 May 2003, Bush prematurely declared that the war had been won. Once the US took over Baghdad the situation quickly deteriorated. >From the beginning, American policy has been characterized by poor planning. By disbanding the army and police force and by allowing indiscriminate looting, the US lost its grip on the law and order situation. It further exacerbated its problems by refusing Sistani’s help in re-establishing order simply because he was a cleric.

The situation now seems hopelessly out of control, with Iraq splintering and spiralling into civil war. Democracy remains a distant dream as the various factions disagree about the future political structure of Iraq. The constitution as it stands is flawed and does not have the backing of all the constituents. Its ratification is being pushed through artificially by the US. Disagreements are being accompanied by increasing violence, further fuelling tensions among religious groups.

The ordinary Iraqi is bearing the brunt of the war. Basic infrastructure in the country has collapsed. Services such as roads, electricity and hospitals are in shambles. Oil, the mainstay of the economy in Iraq, is barely flowing. Iraqis complain that life under the American occupation is worse than it was under Saddam. They have gone from being largely pro-American to being largely anti-American. The inability of the US ground forces to maintain security in the country has attracted many foreign ‘jehadis’. Iraq is now awash with militant fundamentalists making Israel, if anything, less secure and in the process, a billion Muslims have been antagonized.

 

So why did the US fail? Poor planning based on incorrect intelligence was a factor. Although the Americans had negligible assets of their own on the ground, the Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA warned the administration about the complicated social fabric that makes up Iraq. Tom Friedman, who has years of experience in the Middle East, wrote a piece in the New York Times early on laying out the fragile divisions in Iraqi society. The neocons were not listening. They failed to grasp the deep religious and tribal divisions between Iraqis that Saddam had suppressed but not dissipated. They compromised their intelligence further by choosing to ally themselves with Iraqi expats, many of whom were out of touch and had not been in Iraq in over 30 years. Many had their own agendas and told the administration what they wanted to hear. The failure to develop local support was a critical mistake. The US’s initial reliance on Chalabi was naïve and they later damaged their credibility as a reliable ally by publicly dumping him.

Arrogance proved to be their final undoing. Failure was not considered an option for the Bush administration. The unwillingness to admit they were wrong prevented them from introspection and disabled them from changing course. Most dangerously, they had no back-up plan. Today the Iraq war is viewed by the world, and even by a majority of Americans, as a colossal miscalculation. Why did no one in the US, a vibrant democracy, try to oppose the policies?

 

I believe one of the primary reasons for this was the psychological fallout that 9/11 had on the American people. Ordinary Americans were shaken to their roots by the attack in their backyard. They were unprepared and felt vulnerable and exposed. They did not understand the enemy and it made them nervous. This, in a sense, crippled the American mind. In their desperate need for security, they were willing to suspend their reservations, and give the President carte blanche. The few who did dare to question the war were accused of being unpatriotic and any anti-war sentiments were viewed as dishonouring the troops. The Bush machine, unhindered by any effective opposition that would have forced them to re-examine their goals, continued its policies.

The domestic situation has now changed. As troop losses have mounted, the public has become disillusioned. The war is increasingly seen as a burden with no end in sight. This view has been supported by some military commanders and troops who have recently returned from the war. The President’s popularity is at an all time low and the neocons are on the defensive. Many lawmakers, including prominent Republicans such as John McCain, have begun to openly criticize the way the war has been conducted.

This administration’s policies, the war, and its failure have diminished its stature in the world. Has the US reached the limits of its power?

 

The US, with its overwhelming conventional capability, has the capacity to annihilate any country from the air and reduce it to rubble, but it has shown itself to be ineffective against guerrilla warfare. Its aversion to troop losses, and lack of knowledge about local cultures, severely handicaps its effectiveness on the ground. This became obvious in Vietnam, again with the Russians in Afghanistan and is now clear in Iraq. The US, unlike the British, and the old colonialists, does not have the capacity, nor would it be acceptable for it to try to occupy a country. This has been clearly demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In exercising its pre-emptive option, the US gave up the moral high ground. It disregarded the Geneva Convention, resulting in the scandals at Abu Gharib, Baghram and Guantanamo Bay. Countries accused by the US of violating human rights no longer feel it has the moral authority to point fingers at them. The combination of military and moral failures has greatly undermined its status as the leader of the world.

At the cost of 35,000 Iraqi lives, 2,000 US troops’ lives, $250 billion and with its world image in tatters, the foreign policy that this administration has pursued has failed spectacularly. Reality and facts on the ground have lifted the veil of spin with which the administration has tried to blanket us.

Although the cost to the US in dollar terms of this failed mission has been high, the damage it has done to its image is immeasurable. By displaying America’s weaknesses, the Iraq war has diminished its superpower status. The US is no longer feared or considered invincible. The war has compromised its authority and emboldened its enemies.

Countries no longer feel they have to placate the US or support its policies if it is not in their self interest. The most recent example of this loss of US influence was its failure to have other countries endorse Bush’s declaration of an ‘axis of evil’, referring to Iraq, Iran and North Korea. With the US overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran and North Korea knew the threat was an empty one. This encouraged both countries to pursue their nuclear ambitions regardless of world opinion.

 

Ever since the Shah’s departure from Iran in 1979, the US lost one of its most valuable assets in the Middle East. The CIA had helped the Shah secure his throne, and he was viewed as a US puppet. Once the Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeni came to power, Iran became positively anti-American. The hostage crisis, Iran’s anti-Israeli posture and its support of Hezbollah further upset the Americans.

Sanctions were imposed on Iran, but it primarily prohibited US companies from doing business with them. President Bush has tried to use his influence to get other countries to isolate Iran. He put pressure on President Putin not to sell weapons to Iran but failed. Recently, when Iran declared its intention to pursue nuclear technology, the IAEA, with the backing of the Americans, voted to refer it to the Security Council. According to the IAEA, Iran had violated its obligations as a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty. The result was a showdown between Iran and the West. China and Russia, who were opposed to the resolution against Iran, were persuaded to abstain. India, initially stood with Russia and China, but in the end, capitulated to pressure from its new friend – the US. The resolution was deferred, leaving it open to further debate.

Russia, China, and India are all forming economic ties with Iran. Russia is helping it construct a nuclear power plant, China and India with their rapidly expanding economies need sources of energy. For Iran, these countries are preferable outlets for its energy exports – unlike the US, they don’t tell Iran how to conduct its internal affairs. US companies, seeing other countries profiting at their expense, have put pressure on President Bush to ease sanctions on Iran.

 

With the US overexposed and weakened by Iraq, China has begun to emerge as a contender for superpower status. The balance of power has begun to shift. There are already signs that regional alliances are strengthening at the cost of the US. North Korea effectively ignored all attempts by the US to bring it to heel. It pays far more attention to China’s views than those of the US. A new strategic alliance among eastern countries extending as far west as Pakistan, has begun. The absence of the US at the recent ASEAN meeting was conspicuous and may contribute to reducing its influence in the region.

America’s friends in the Middle East are also unhappy with it. Its foreign policy is viewed by the Arabs as being excessively pro-Israel. The chaos in Iraq has destabilized the whole region with fundamentalists spilling across borders. America’s closeness to the Saudi’s, whose values contradict the US push for democratic reform in other countries, is seen as hypocritical. In light of all this, it is unclear if US threats to Syria to reform will have support in the region.

 

European countries are alarmed by the way the Bush administration has handled the war. Their calls to the US to balance its Mid-East policy by resolving the Palestinian issue remain ignored. Many of them have large Muslim populations to worry about and they feel that the policies this administration has pursued has created problems for all of them. Both Spain and Italy have withdrawn their support for the US after suffering directly as a consequence of their involvement in the war.

There has been an international attempt to try and contain the US. Many feel it is unhealthy and unsafe for the world community to have just one superpower. Without checks and balances, it is all too easy for a powerful country to become a bully and destabilize the international order.

This puts India in an unusual predicament. After years of being ignored by the US, it suddenly finds itself being courted just as US influence and credibility is waning. Should India pursue a regional alliance with its neighbours, Russia and China? Or, should it accept the overtures of its new suitor? America has realized it needs all the friends it can get. Having dismissed the Europeans in his first term, President Bush is trying to mend his fences with them. In an effort to regain its influence in the East, the US is trying to form new alliances. Although it remains the world’s superpower, its influence has significantly eroded and it is unlikely that things will turn around for this administration. The future seems up for grabs and if the world continues to polarize, India may need to make a bet as to whose side it want to be on.