THIS paper examines two sets of questions related to the meanings of ‘democracy' in Nepal. The first explores the various meanings that different groups of people currently attach to democracy. The second traces the historical emergence and transformation of those meanings over the last seven decades, more specifically the process of popularization of the meaning of ‘democracy' by transferring the concept from elite groups to the masses.
Both sets of questions are inextricably linked. What people think about democracy (and the moral burden it carries) today has strong roots in how the very word got established in Nepali society. Three major processes have perhaps had the most far reaching impact on the formation of the idea of democracy in Nepal.
The first is the process of implantation of the ‘western' idea of liberal democracy – the ideals of individual liberty, freedom of speech, equality of citizenship, representation in the state through periodic elections, and so on. This began seven decades ago when the would-be political leaders of Nepal were exposed to the movement for independence in India (Koirala 2055).
The second is the emergence and spread of left ideology with its own notion of democracy and how this relates to liberal democracy. The spread of communist ideals after the Russian and the Chinese Revolutions had a far reaching impact on the way democracy got reconceptualized among the left political parties, and through them in the constituency they created. The formation of the Communist Party of Nepal also coincided with the translation of The Communist Manifesto into Nepali (Shrestha 2053 B.S.).
The third is the appropriation of the concept of democracy for ideologically sustaining the 30 year rule of absolute monarchy during the panchayat era. Gandhi's village republic, mixed with ancient Hindu practices of elite male village council, found its expression in the partyless panchayat democracy with, of course, many permutations. Certain ideas about democracy – that it suited the soil and climate – got spread through state-controlled mass media (Onta 2004). These three processes have left a deep legacy in the way democracy is conceptualized across Nepalese society.
The idea of democracy today evokes a mixture of responses. In Nepali language democracy is translated as ‘loktantra', ‘janatantra' and ‘prajatantra'. Loktantra has come into common use only recently as an attempt on the part of some intellectuals and political leaders to imagine democracy independently of monarchy in Nepal. The use of prajatantra has a history of over seven decades. Janatantra and janabaad are commonly associated with communist parties in Nepal and generally convey a republican setup. The most popular term, however, is prajatantra. The distinctions between these words are, however, fundamental as they point to different histories, conceptualizations and understandings about the word.
Democracy is also used with qualifiers – people's democracy (janabaad) by communist parties, liberal democracy (udar prajatantra) by centre-right and centrist parties. Often multiparty democracy ( bahudal ) is also equated with democracy in popular lexicon, particularly after the political change of 1990 led to the establishment of multiparty democracy. In that sense it connotes a specific form of political arrangement in which political parties vie for state power through elections.
Nepal has over 100 officially recognized languages and none of them have directly translatable words for democracy. All the major linguistic groups use ‘prajatantra' or ‘loktantra' or ‘janabad' or ‘bahudal' (multiparty democracy), depending on the user's political background. For those uninitiated in the formal political processes, ‘prajatantra' is the most commonly used term.
Nevertheless, the word ‘democracy' is familiar to a significant majority of the population. Its mass diffusion through expanding networks of radio, television, print media and other formal and informal communication channels has ensured that most Nepali people have heard, read, discussed, pondered over and written about this word. The meanings, however, have remained varied and marked by ambivalence and confusion.
‘Ordinary' people in Nepal are not a homogeneous lot. Thus, words like ‘democracy' do not have meaning independent of the context in which they are uttered and used. The meanings also vary depending upon whether one belongs to certain groups, institutions or political affiliations. Democracy does not mean the same thing for both the dalits and brahmins, for example; nor to men and women. For the economically poor democracy implies freedom from hunger, want and destitution. For people in the remote areas democracy suggests equitable allocation of state budgets, accessibility and basic infrastructure.
For women, democracy implies equality of citizenship and inclusion in state and other institutions. Women, again, are not homogenous. The notion of the Nepali woman exists, if at all, to obfuscate rather than illuminate the social reality of differentiation among women themselves (Tamang 2004). Meanings vary depending on class, caste, ethnicity and geographical location. Therefore, the ‘ordinary people' exemplify a variety of meanings associated with democracy.
Prajatantra in common parlance also communicates a nuanced feeling of frustration and failure. It carries some moral burden in the form of people's expectations. The non-fulfilment of those expectations because of the failure of major actors to fulfil people's expectations has created general frustration with the system, foring introspection about democracy in all spaces of public discourse.
At the level of popular action too democracy entails a moral burden. It is a space of possibilities for people to act – to organize, press their demands, create institutions that address those demands, and advocate policies. A variety of social and political actions carried out by dalits, janajatis, women, rural poor and many other historically marginalized groups are pointers towards that.
Dual tendencies, therefore, are visible in the landscape of the popular discourse on democracy in Nepal. On the one hand are all the grudges and frustrations about the non-fulfilment of the dream; on the other are instances of transformative action made possible by the opening up of democratic space after the political change of 1990 (Bhattarai 2003).
Those at the helm of affairs in society and polity have their own understanding of democracy. For some the functioning of the formal system is best contrasted to democratic promise. Therefore, corruption needs to be controlled, cadres disciplined and party leaders made accountable. Thus, democracy simultaneously embodies both the ideals of a functioning system as well as frustration with its non-materialization. But for a majority among the elite sections of Nepali society, democracy is also an anathema, an antithesis of a ‘normal' social order they were accustomed to for several hundred years. The cacophony of voices that the post-1990 political changes gave rise to are seen as a threat to social order. They, therefore, equate democracy with a system that has destroyed this mythical harmony among diverse social groups in Nepal.
There are thus two broad positions among the elites regarding democracy: one which aspires for order and denounces the democratic system as much too open to be orderly. The general strikes, organized demands and demonstrations challenging the status quo to them appear undesirable and disorderly. The democracy that opened up possibilities for seemingly unruly activities is a harbinger of chaos and disorder and totalitarianism or benevolent dictatorship is what is most suitable for Nepal. The other position accepts democracy not as an ideal of substantive change, but as limited to procedural aspects and arrangements of some formal sets of rules defining the rights and duties of citizens.
Democracy, however, is not limited to a set of procedures and institutions. It carries with it some moral burdens among the ordinary citizens. But the specifics of these burdens vary; it does not carry the same moral burden, or promise if you like, to all the people. Access to societal resources, participation in making decisions that affect one's life, removing the historical injustice and indignity, and imagining an equitable, plural and inclusive futures are all part of the promise of democracy. The state is seen not only as a neutral arbiter in the marketplace, but as an active agent for providing social services (Onta 2004, pp. 97-124), ensuring social justice and promoting equality.
After the political change of 1990, new actors – broadly lumped within ‘civil society' – have grown and spread. Democracy in this context is not limited to the state domain. Civil society in the initial years was conceptualized as the very foundation of democracy, as a moral force for rectifying the authoritarian tendencies of the state and rapacity of the market. At the same time, civil society too has to pass the test of democratic standards. As with the state, democracy is about inclusive institutions, procedural fairness and substantive involvement of the civil society.
The Constitution of 1990 outlines a number of promises of the state towards its citizens in the form of directive principles of state policy. While the directive principles and policies outlined in the constitution are not justiciable, they nonetheless point towards the state role envisaged, straddling economy, culture, health and education. The constitution states:
1. It shall be the chief objective of the state to promote conditions of welfare on the basis of the principles of an open society by establishing a just system in all aspects of national life, including social, economic and political life, while at the same time protecting the lives, property and liberty of the people.
2. The fundamental economic objective of the state shall be to transform the national economy into an independent and self-reliant system by preventing the available resources and means of the country from being concentrated within a limited section of society, by making arrangements for the equitable distribution of economic gains on the basis of social justice, by making such provisions as will prevent economic exploitation of any class or individual, and by giving preferential treatment and encouragement to national enterprises, both private and public.
3. The social objective of the state shall be to establish and develop, on the foundation of justice and morality, a healthy social life by eliminating all types of economic and social inequalities and by establishing harmony amongst the various castes, tribes, religions, languages, races and communities.
4. It shall be the chief responsibility of the state to maintain conditions suitable to the enjoyment of the fruits of democracy through wider participation of the people in the governance of the country and by way of decentralisation, and to promote general welfare by making provision for the protection and promotion of human rights by maintaining tranquillity and order in the society.
The constitution outlines a guiding policy which delineates the role of the state in different sectors. This includes ‘raising the standard of living of general public through the development of infrastructures such as education, health, housing and employment of the people of all regions,' equitable distribution of economic resources, and addressing environmental problems. It also envisages measures for ‘protecting the rights and interests' of working people, safeguarding the ‘rights and interests of children' and ensuring ‘that they are not exploited', and ‘make gradual arrangements for free education.' It also outlines special provisions for ‘orphans, helpless women, the aged, the disabled and incapacitated persons.'
A variety of people see an opportunity for enhancing their potential in a democratic space. They represent an odd mixture: the top leaders of political parties, cadres close to these political leaders, intellectuals, and others. At the same time, historically marginalized groups have also found in democracy opportunities to get organized and put forth a variety of demands. Individual freedom and freedom of expression was utilized by young people to explore new ideas and practices. Broadly, these groups carry positive notions of democracy.
For a large section of dalits, janajatis and other marginalized groups, democracy offers spaces for transforming the existing situation. Therefore, even while they are not positively inclined towards what exists today, democracy still remains a positive ideal – a different democracy, a more inclusive one, which allows for greater participation and promotes equality in a substantive sense (Mainali 2004). For them, democracy is not something ‘finished', but is in-the-making, constantly transforming.
Nevertheless, not many have come forward to defend democracy in the face of threats from both right and left extremism. Clearly there is a wide gap between accepting democracy as a positive value and defending it in the face of threats. This was clearly evident in the lack of popular participation in the movement against the king's takeover of power on 4 October 2002, or in the gradual and steady marauding of fundamental freedoms by Maoists and the state in the name of people's war and counterinsurgency. Even as the ownership of the democratic process was beginning to extend to the lower rungs of society, Nepal seems once again trapped in the shadow of authoritarianism.
Democracy is justified in different ways. The fact that historically subjugated and marginalized people have begun to assert their place within an open democratic space is itself the biggest justification. This was simply impossible during the 30-odd years of panchayat rule. Transparency in the functioning of public institutions too is an integral aspect of democracy. The notion of equality of citizenship – irrespective of class, gender, caste and ethnicity – is another major justification. In broad terms, democracy is preferred because it allows for the flowering of innate potential of individuals in society. In this sense, the justifications are largely based on ideals imagined, not reality lived.
The failure of political institutions to live up to the expectations leading to an alienation of the general public from them is a major anxiety expressed around the practice of democracy today. Democracy is often reduced to some formal and alienating procedural rituals, as has been the tendency in the last 14 years of practice after the political change in 1990. Equally, as the ideals of free market and liberalization get a strong impetus from powerful international actors, democracy may in fact be reduced to either a smokescreen of class rule, or at best an arbiter in the playing field of unbridled market competition.
For some groups the increasing assertion of historically marginalized people has become a cause of concern. Some political scientists and political leaders have argued that too many demands on the state without enhancing its ability to deliver could weaken the very state which is supposed to respond to those demands.
The increasing domination of international agencies in policy-making also creates a contradictory situation. On the one hand, political parties are expected to compete in the political arena based on their own policy and programme proposals. On the other, dependence on foreign aid implies that state policies have increasingly to conform to the dictates of international agencies (Panday 2000). This creates a situation in which democratic space is not always an arena of contestation among different political actors presenting different policy and programmatic choices.
For instance, the increasing reliance on the market for the delivery of social services leads to policies that are weak in substantive involvement in the social life of its citizens. The emphasis on limiting procedural aspects of democracy comes from this increased pressure to distance the state from interventions in the social sector through budgetary provisions, policies and programmes (Roka 2004).
Democracy is also justified in relation to the alternatives, which are not acceptable. Some have argued that democracy may be bad, but represents the least evil. Nevertheless, even the support for democracy based on a firm negation of non-democratic options, comes with some ambivalence. For example, while people do not accept autocratic rule by the king, no voices are raised against autocracy within political parties and other institutions of society. Therefore, such people only support democracy in a very formal sense of periodic elections and constitutional guarantees. Similarly, others who might oppose military rule are willing to accept rule by experts as necessary. They may be called the developmentalist democrats, who have internalized the notion of expert-led development.
The limits of procedural democracy are best captured in the widespread debates about exclusion, the need for inclusive political processes and institutions, an assertion of the equality of citizenship and the raising of new demands by a variety of actors. In these debates, those arguing for more substantive democracy enjoy a clear edge. Even the free market liberals, for whom democracy is nothing beyond a mechanism to ensure the rule of law and individual freedom, and who promoted increased liberalization in the initial years, have now begun to realize the limits in the face of growing demands for state responsibility (Onta 2004).
The substantive claims are not limited to the state domain alone. The campaigns for the elimination of untouchability in society – led mainly by dalit activists – indicate the need for a new social contract between different people's, not based on the Laws of Manu, but on the substantive equality of human beings. At the community level, the historical subjugation of cultures in the form of Sanskritisation by dominant Hindus – in direct collusion with the state – is today being interrogated and demands for a secular state are finding wider acceptance.
The women's movement too has advanced a number of new notions and practices which point towards democracy, not only in the formal procedural sense but in the everyday realm of social and political life. Equality of citizenship, right to parental property, right to control over reproduction, among others, have been at the forefront of the mobilizations.
Procedural issues are now being discussed in relation to substantive issues. The issue of inclusive political institutions, for example, is both substantive and procedural. As a procedural issue it relates to designing institutions in a way that make possible the demands for inclusion of different sections of society. But these procedural debates are equally an integral part of the substantive question of equality of citizenship raised by historically marginalized sections of society. Proposals for electoral reforms of the political party institutions or the demand for a federal governing system are, among others, such issues. They fundamentally alter the substantive arrangements in society and polity by making it possible for excluded sections of society to assert their political positions.
These different meanings, imaginations and burdens that democracy is associated with have a complex origin. One part lies in the dialectical relations between extant debate and practice of democracy; the other lies in the way the very concept emerged in a particular historical context and got transformed.
The idea of democracy in Nepal arose in the context of changes occurring across the world in the first half of the 20th century. Those were turbulent times and through a variety of channels, Nepalis were exposed to the changes elsewhere. Many who served in the Imperial Army during the First and Second World Wars saw places and people other than their own and when they came back home, they introduced new ideas.
News of the Russian Revolution was quick to spread and created an interest in Marxism, Leninism, dialectal materialism, and the Communist Manifesto. Interested forces began to invite communist leaders from around the world, including India. The immediate neighbourhood was increasingly becoming restless. The Indian independence movement attracted a large section of the Nepali intelligentsia who were later to import and spread its ideas into Nepal. Prominent among them were the Nepali Congress and Communist Party.
Broadly, two sets of ideas emerged in India during the movement for independence – for the communist groups, the idea of democracy smacked of the capitalist system; for the motley group of socialists, Gandhians and traditionalists, the independence movement provided a backdrop in which to imagine a mix of European traditions of democracy and local variants. The idea of democracy in Nepal developed in that context.
The published literature soon expanded. The formation of the Gorkha Parishad in the late 1920s could be considered as the first formal occasion of implantation of the concept. For people who formed the Gorkha Parishad, democracy meant an overthrow of the autocratic Rana regime. They, however, failed to sufficiently think through alternative arrangements.
More concrete ideas emerged among the socialists and communists who were largely exiled in India in the late 1940s. Inside Nepal, they had clandestine contacts (Koirala, Aatmabritanta ). Both the major parties primarily responsible for putting the word democracy into use in Nepal – the Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal – were established in India, and their senior leaders were exposed to diverse political strands. Some leaders soon began to articulate the notion of democracy in Nepali language, viz. Pushpalal translated the Communist Manifesto into Nepali.
The political change of 1951 marked a new juncture for the spread of the notion giving rise to a new political vocabulary of democracy. As Nepali Congress activists began to advance into different territories, they also began to organize mass meetings and shout slogans. A substantial majority of the people were exposed to this new vocabulary for the first time, receiving what they heard with a mixture of awe and fear.
The spread of political parties among the general people after 1951 led to a further diffusion of the idea. Two broad positions dominated the notions of democracy – liberal democracy and the communist notion of democracy. For communists, the liberal democracy that Nepali Congress proclaimed as its fundamental ideal was only a smokescreen for the class rule of landlords, emerging comprador bourgeoisie and the urban rich (Shrestha 2053 B.S.). On the other hand the Nepali Congress, while accepting liberal democracy as a foundation, also had programmatic content of substantive social transformation. Therefore, this divide was not one between those who favoured pure liberalism and others who advocated a communist revolution.
Political mobilization come to a halt after the king took over power through a military-backed constitutional coup in December 1960. A new idea of democracy was promoted through the state apparatus – panchayat democracy with its supposed roots in tradition and emphasis on harmonious relationships among different people in the country. The political parties, which were banned in the aftermath of the coup, had to operate clandestinely. The repressive regime, while promoting itself as ‘rooted', indulged in brutal suppression of political opponents. It also tried to assimilate a pliant section of the erstwhile party leaders. Patron-client relationships between the rulers and subjects were promoted through development projects.
The political change of 1990 allowed not only open functioning but also created possibilities for other sectors of society to openly articulate their visions of the future. The democratic opening thus provided a plethora of spaces for debating, critiquing, imagining and building different democratic spheres. It also provided spaces for articulating the need for transforming the existing social, political and other institutions which were not democratic.
The transformation of ‘western' democracy began to occur when it was put into practice. As the limits of the formal procedural aspect of democracy grew clearer, new ideas emerged that led to a remaking of ‘western democracy'. Today democracy is being freshly imagined as new issues come to the fore and new actors begin to assert their place in society, economy and polity. The real promise of democracy is in its making.
* Extracted from a background paper prepared for the project on The State of Democracy in South Asia/Nepal.
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