WEAPONS are as old as humanity itself. Be it stones or sticks, or much later iron and steel, different weapons have been used both for protection and hunting. Being primitive and requiring skills they, however, had limited damage potential. It is really after the Second World War that the technology of small arms and weapons underwent a radical change viz., the invention of the ak rifle by Alexander Kalashnikov.

What is noteworthy is that while leaders and nations, given the experience of the two world wars, concentrated on placing restrictions on the sale and technology transfer of big and conventional weapons, they tragically ignored the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Even major research centres like SIPRI of Stockholm have not undertaken any major study on the spread of small arms. Most research over the past decades has focused on the transfer of conventional weapons like tanks, heavy artillery, aircraft, warships and missiles.¹

Though the international system, including the UN machinery, has succeeded in preventing any major outbreak of war on a global scale, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has significantly endangered national and international peace and security. In his foreword to the report by the panel of government experts on small arms, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, emphasised: ‘Readily available and easy to access, small arms and light weapons have been the primary or sole tools of violence in almost every recent conflict dealt by the United Nations. In the hands of irregular troops operating with scant respect for international and humanitarian law, these weapons have taken a heavy toll of human lives, with women and children accounting for nearly 80% of the casualties.’²

The spread of small arms and light weapons has reached dimensions which go beyond national security concerns, endangering the stability of civil society.³ The global spread of a culture of violence threatens the very foundation of democracy and development.⁴ This paper attempts to examine the threat posed to India’s national security by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The genesis of today’s glut of small arms can be traced to the Cold War era.⁵ Both the Super Powers pushed arms into various parts of the world in pursuit of their immediate and selfish goals. While the Soviet leaders justified supply of weapons to communist movements as ‘material support to comrades engaged in overthrowing various exploitative regimes’ and ‘establishing the rule of the proletariat’, the U.S. administration did the same in the name of containing and combating the Red evil.

Even after the end of the Cold War these pipelines have remained open. In Africa, for instance, there is a well-defined channel down the eastern seaboard. It is believed that approximately 1.5 million AK-47 rifles are unaccounted in Mozambique alone.⁶ Proliferation in Latin America is related not just to the Cold War but also to the drug trade. The extent of proliferation causes no surprise in a situation which is both congenial and permits easy access to the sophisticated arms markets of North America, especially in the U.S. Another contributory factor is the presence of private security agencies and private armies who generate huge demand for small arms and light weapons.

It would be incorrect to only blame Cold War politics for weapons proliferation. The post World War era has witnessed an unprecedented growth of industry for all kinds of products. The prevailing philosophy, especially in the developed world, is that governments should not interfere with the production process. Instead, they are expected to actively support the trade of their products all over the globe. These aggressive market policies have resulted in the production of many undesirable goods, including small arms. At present about 300 companies produce small arms, light weapons and accessories, most of them in Europe and America.⁷

The global proliferation of small arms and light weapons has resulted in serious intra-state violence – ethnic, religious, linguistic conflicts. According to a recent UN study, there were 90 armed conflicts all over the globe in 1993. In these conflicts, 90% of the deaths were the result of small arms and 90% of the people who died in these conflicts were civilians.⁸

All South Asian countries face the problem of small arms and light weapons proliferation. It would be appropriate to start the sojourn of the ‘gun scenario’ in the subcontinent from Dera Adam Khel, a small town in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. This town has been famous for its people’s ingenuity in the production of light weapons for the last two centuries and more. Though an integral part of Pakistan, the country’s laws are not enforceable since Dera is a part of the tribal area where even the laws of the British Empire could not be enforced.⁹ Its gunsmiths are known for their ability to produce different types of weapons. Some of their custom-made rifles are of such good quality that they would fetch around $10,000 in the western markets. In our region, such weapons are available for less than a tenth of that price.¹⁰

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan gave further impetus to the already fertile ground for proliferation in the region. The Soviet military takeover of Afghanistan drew in the U.S. It could have either directly intervened in Afghanistan or instead supported various groups to fight the Soviets. Given the memory of their humiliating debacle in Vietnam, the U.S. administration opted for a CIA planned operation of huge indirect support to the local population.¹¹ The modus operandi was to purchase arms from various sources and hand them over to Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence, which in turn would coordinate their distribution to the Afghan rebels.¹²

The first major consignment of Kalashnikovs was purchased from China. Thereafter, arms of all types, including shoulder-fired Stinger missiles, were purchased from different sources and handed over to the Afghan rebels. By 1987, this arms route had placed over 65,000 tons of weapons in Afghanistan.¹³ Many of these weapons were sold by the cash-starved Afghan rebels and subsequently found their way into various parts of Pakistan. It is estimated that about 800,000 illegal weapons are floating around in Punjab province, 500,000 in Sindh and 250,000 in Baluchistan.¹⁴ Over 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles are believed to be available in Karachi, all outside of government control.¹⁵ Since the U.S. administration had little control over the isi and the Pakistan government on the proper distribution of these weapons, they often found their way into India. These weapons have been the major instruments of trouble for the Indian government for over a decade in both Punjab and Kashmir.¹⁶

Sri Lanka, engulfed in ethnic violence, too has become a major storehouse of weapons. It is reported that Tamil militants supplied arms to Naxalites in South India. The arms proliferation in Myanmar has also assumed serious proportions due to insurgencies. The weapons are sourced mainly from the South East Asian weapon markets. The drug cartels of Myanmar play a role in the induction of arms into this country. Over the years, Bangladesh has become a major base for Indian militants in the North East, particularly for arms procurement from the South East Asian markets. Given such an extensive g lobal and intense regional proliferation of small arms/light weapons, the implications for an ethnically, linguistically and socially diverse country like India can be well imagined.

Though the problem of Kashmir has festered for over 50 years, the growth of violence and an unprecedented gun culture is only 10 years old. The people of Kashmir, under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, opted to be part of India with a special status not given to any other Indian state to fulfil their aspirations. Except for brief intervals of President’s Rule, they have elected their leaders, unlike their Kashmiri brothers in POK. So why has such a major eruption of violence occurred in Kashmir over the past decade?

One major reason is the easy availability of small arms in neighbouring Pakistan and Afghanistan primarily from the American established Afghan arms pipeline. The ISI, which was given the task of arming the mujahideens and other Afghan rebels, took advantage of this clandestine operation to push huge quantities of weapons into Kashmir.¹⁷ Most weapons recovered in Kashmir are foreign-made and similar to those in the Afghan-Pakistan area. Had the CIA kept a ledger of the arms purchased for the Afghan pipeline, each of the recovered weapons could have been traced back to their origin. The proliferation of arms can be gauged from the recoveries made by the Indian security forces in Kashmir. Between 1990 to 1998, around 18000 AK series weapons, over 7000 pistols and revolvers, nearly 500 rocket launchers and other assorted arms were recovered.

The situation was more or less the same in Punjab. Unlike the Kashmiris, the Sikhs had no reservations about being part of India when it became independent. This prosperous state had few serious grievances except that it had no heavy industry. But such grievances cannot be addressed by inducting a huge armoury of weapons into civil society. Though there was a mishandling of religious issues by those in power, this alone could not have generated such unprecedented violence in the absence of Pakistan pushing in a huge quantity of weapons.

There is clear evidence that Pakistan misused American supplied weapons to create trouble in Punjab. About 2500 AK series rifles were seized by the Punjab police between 1988 and 1992. In the same period, there were about 9000 civilian deaths.¹⁸ In the last three years, from 1996 to 1998, only three weapon of ak series were recovered and there were hardly any reports of terrorist killings in Punjab.

There are some genuine and unresolved grievances of various communities in the North East, but none which cannot be resolved peacefully. The resolution of the Mizo problem is an example of how the use of democratic means is superior to violence. The two decade long insurgency came to an end with the signing of the Mizo Accord. The Mizos dropped the demand of secession from India and elected militant leader Laldenga as chief minister. Today, with peace in Mizoram, it is doing better than other north eastern states.

However, there are a growing number of militant outfits operating all over the North East, with huge amounts of small arms and light weapons. But there is a distinction between the arms proliferation in the North East and in Punjab and Kashmir. The weapons in the North East have been essentially purchased from various sources, mainly the markets of South East Asia; the weapons in Kashmir and Punjab are pushed in by the ISI. The North East militants have to extort a lot of money from the local population to buy weapons.

The Naga militants, the oldest in the North East, have accumulated weapons from various sources over the last five decades, some with the help of foreign countries. The major insurgent group in the area, the NSCN, now acts as the big brother of the other groups in teaching them the ropes of how to acquire weapons. The violence of ULFA and power of the organisation increased considerably only after it acquired weapons from the NSCN in 1983-84, though the organisation was set up in 1979. Thereafter, ULFA took to terrorising traders to extract money for purchasing weapons. Today, it perhaps holds more weapons than any other militant group in the region. The insurgents of Manipur too hold a large quantity of arms; proliferation here has a direct link with drugs.

Weapons proliferation in South India, especially in Andhra Pradesh, has gradually assumed serious dimensions. Naxalism reached Andhra Pradesh in the late 1960s in the belief that the solution to the problems of the oppressed lay in armed struggle. In the initial stages, the Naxalites had only single and double barrel guns, mostly stolen from the village landlords; today they have AK-47, AK-56 and other sophisticated weapons. A linkage between these groups and the LTTE cannot be ruled out, if not on ideological grounds then for tactical reasons like weapons acquisition. The ultra communist groups operating from Madhya Pradesh and Bihar too possess modern and sophisticated weapons.

Another dimension of small arms proliferation worthy of attention is the mode of transnational transfer. Traditionally, arms were smuggled into the country through land and sea borders. But the air-dropping of arms at Purlia on the Bihar-Bengal border has added a new dimension.

Without a meaningful control of small arms proliferation in the subcontinent, there can be no end to the so-called insurgencies and separatist movements. If there is an understanding or accord with one outfit, there will soon be another with similar or more unreasonable demands. Even if we were to sort out our problems in Kashmir by containing Pakistan, the insurgency in the North East would fester unless there is significant change in the scenario of proliferation of arms in the region. Should the ongoing talks with the NSCN result in an understanding, it is not certain whether the outcome would be acceptable to all Nagas. Equally, there may be no lasting peace in Assam even if we bring ULFA to the negotiating table. There are several others, like the Bodos and Dimasas, with their own ‘aspirations’ and arms to engage the state. Guns do not perish and easily change hands for money.

This situation has serious ramifications for agencies of the state like the police, army and judiciary. The police is trained to control ordinary crime and maintain general law and order. With the induction of deadly weapons like the AK series in civil society, the police too is compelled to acquire arms and becomes more repressive. A stage is soon crossed when it is not possible for the police to control violence and the army is inducted. Such induction, though ostensibly for short periods, invariably gets prolonged.

The army, which is trained to fight the enemy, gets dragged into fighting its own countrymen. Long drawn internal security duties by the armed forces reduces their focus and alertness. It also generates popular resentment against the army, otherwise respected by the common man. Pakistan’s long term goal seems to be to commit the Indian Army to internal security duties for long periods so as to reduce its edge over the Pakistan Army.

Prolonged insurgencies with the fear of death hovering over the heads of civilian officials, including lower court judges, adversely affects their work. Those who live in these remote parts are often threatened and the militants get bail as soon as they are arrested by the security forces. Given this fear, there is a general erosion in the efficiency and independent functioning of administration.

Our Constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights. All democratic societies recognise that respect for human rights is an essential requirement of civil society. But it is difficult in insurgency and militancy affected areas to protect human rights to the fullest extent, since the state is under severe pressure to control violence. Its security forces get brutalised under the pressure to restore law and order. As a result there are frequent complaints about human rights violations.

The link between weapons proliferation and an increase in human rights violations was noted by the Human Rights Watch, a Washington based NGO, way back in 1994. The report establishes the link between the Afghan pipeline weapons and the violence in Punjab and Kashmir. It specifically recommends that the U.S. should investigate allegations that stockpiles of pipeline weapons, ostensibly under ISI control, are freely available; that effective measures for recovering and destroying these weapons be formulated in consultation with the government of Pakistan.19 Such reports are rare. Most human rights organisations fail to see the issue in an overall perspective and only place the state under pressure, giving leverage to people who mindlessly use dreadful weapons to liquidate others for some cause or the other. Such pressures only erode the authority of and respect for the state in the eyes of the people.

Though the Indian Constitution is secular, our politics sometimes creates communal situations. Earlier the administration, especially at the district level, could deal with them effectively because the weapons used were mainly primitive. In the recent past, however, the situation has changed. Even well-trained forces like the Rapid Action Force are ineffective in communal situations where weapons are in plenty. More disturbing is the use of explosives like rdx, viz. in the Bombay blasts and the recent Coimbatore incident. It is probable that Pakistan may try to arm some disaffected groups with small weapons. If so, it will be difficult to control communal violence and the casualties.

The threat of these lethal weapons has been used to effect displacement of ethnic groups. Kashmiri Pundits, the original inhabitants of the Valley, are today terrified about returning despite having lived in miserable conditions in Jammu for years. The Bodo militant groups have begun ethnic cleansing to drive away various other ethnic populations from the Bodo Autonomous Council area. Thousands of refugees have been housed in camps over the last few years. Often, frustration drives the deprived youth from these relief camps to acquire arms for protection. There are reports that even the timid Santhals of Kokhrajar district in Assam, who have been living in relief camps, have taken up arms against the Bodos. The genesis of many civil wars lies in such scenarios.

The democratic process is threatened by the proliferation of arms. The frequent postponement of elections in the troubled states has become routine. To hold free and fair elections the situation should be congenial. These areas often need security forces to give minimum protection to poll personnel, election agents and contesting candidates, apart from the forces required to maintain law and order.

Even when elections are held in these weapon proliferated areas, the electoral process falls short of being free and fair. Reports from the North East indicate that a large number of willing candidates do not enter the poll process; some even withdraw after filing nominations. Despite the secret ballot, voters are threatened to support a particular candidate or not to vote at all, like what happens in some areas of Bihar where illegal weapons abound.

In India, the production of small arms and light weapons is totally under government control. A few designated ordinance factories produce weapons for the security forces. Only some inconsequential weapons like single and double barrel (12 bore) guns, air rifles and air pistols are under private manufacture under a well regulated license system. Their sale is closely monitored and regulated by the state authorities.

The Indian Arms Act of 1959 and various rules and regulations govern the sale and transfer of weapons in India. The district magistrates who issues licenses initiate a police enquiry before a person is licensed to buy a weapon. The licensed arms agents are frequently checked to ensure that they maintain proper sale and transfer registers. The state governments may also issue licenses and monitor the district authorities. Weapon licensing in India is, perhaps, one of the few well-regulated systems.

Responding to the proliferation of weapons and the onslaught of terrorism in the various parts of the country, the Government of India in 1987 withdrew many powers of the state and district authorities to issue licenses. The central government, which assumed the sole power to issue prohibited bore weapons like 9 mm pistols and semi-automatic weapons like carbines, is cautious in issuing licenses. Automatic weapons like AK series rifles, of course, are completely prohibited. For the last decade, after withdrawing powers from the state and district authorities, the GOI has exercised tremendous restraint – issuing only about 100 licenses per year on average as against about 25,000 applicants.

With such a conservative policy and rigid mechanism to control weapons manufacture and sale, how has proliferation taken place? What is controlled are only legal weapons. Illegal weapons are smuggled into the country by various groups. Hence, there is a need for much stricter checks on our land and sea borders.

In August 1997, a UN expert group submitted a report to the General Assembly and recommended a set of practical measures to reduce the weapons already in circulation and to prevent future accumulations.²⁰ A specific recommendation which concerns India relates to proliferation of small arms in Afghanistan.

The group recommended that the UN should assist in convening an inter-Afghan forum to prepare, inter-alia, a schedule to account for, retrieve and destroy the small arms and light weapons left unaccounted in Afghanistan, once national conciliation is reached. This recommendation is unlikely to be implemented in the near future. Whether we follow the present ‘hands off’ policy towards Afghanistan or start taking some more interest at an appropriate and future date, such an international effort will be in the direct interest of India’s national security.

Another important but general recommendation is to convene an international conference on all aspects of the illicit arms trade based on the issues identified in the report. India should encourage such an initiative to bring about some practical international controls on manufacture and sale of small arms and light weapons.

In recent times, especially after Pokhran II, national security has assumed overwhelming importance in our foreign policy. With a minimum nuclear deterrence, it is unlikely that India will go to war with its neighbours. But what is more likely is the continuation of the proxy war designs of Pakistan with weapon proliferation into new regions of the country. The Kargil incident provides a clear indication of the likely scenario. In view of our national security interests and the current trend in international opinion, India should bring the issue of proliferation of small weapons to the forefront of national security policies and foreign policy goals.

On the domestic front, though the situation on arms controls is fairly effective, there is still scope for improvement. National arms laws and rules need to be further tightened. The recent statement of the Union Home Minister about amending the Explosive Act is a step in the right direction. It may be worthwhile considering amendments to the Arms Act and Explosive Act together. The goi in consultation with some state governments like Bihar has to develop a concrete action plan to weed out the production and sale illegal of weapons, however small their present caliber, before the problem becomes unmanageable.

We also need to build up a database on weapons licenses issued so far. Today, every district in India is connected with NICNET, a national network of computers. Though some district magistrates have computerized the data, the Union Home Ministry should design a uniform software.

As argued earlier, it will be impossible to control weapons proliferation in our country without achieving at least some minimum regional and global controls on weapon proliferation. Our foreign policy should evolve a regional and global strategy to safeguard national security interests. India has taken the initiative by drafting a regional agreement to control arms proliferation on the model of the agreement of Organisation of American States. A response from SAARC members is awaited. Though Pakistan may not agree to this Indian move, it should not be a deterrent.

In our bilateral dealings – from the Persian Gulf in the West to Malakka straits in the East – we must keep the issue of arms proliferation and spread of drugs at the forefront. Two of the world’s largest drug growing areas are in our vicinity – the golden crescent to the West and the golden triangle to the East. Our missions in the countries of these two areas should keep a constant watch on the drug-related developments and pass on information to the security and narcotic authorities. Such an approach will find some common ground with the U.S. and Europe.

Equally important is to push for more stringent international controls on the production and sale of weapons. Any meaningful global initiative is possible only when a major power like the U.S. is agreeable. This may appear difficult because of the attitude of the U.S. gun lobby, but the situation is fast changing. Today in the U.S. public opinion is mounting against the prevailing gun-culture and politicians are paying increasing attention to the problem. Few imagined a decade ago that Princess Diana would become an activist on the landmine issue. We should be well-prepared for future international initiatives to protect our national interests.

 

 

*The views expressed in the article are personal and not those of the government.

Footnotes

1. Michael T. Klare, ‘Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in Post-Cold War Era’, in Jasjit Singh (ed.) Light Weapons and International Security, Delhi, 1995, p. 1.

2. UN Expert Committee Report on Small Arms published in Strategic Digest 28(1), January 1998, p. 3.

3. Jaswant Singh, National Security: An Outline of Our Security, New Delhi, p. 69.

4. Red Cross Report, Arms Availability and Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Expert Group Meeting, 18-20 May, p. 15.

5. R.T. Naylor, ‘The Rise of the Modern Arms Black Market and the Fall of Supply-Side Control’, in Virginia Gamba (ed.), Society Under Siege, Vol. 1, South Africa, p. 66.

6. Swadesh Rana, Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts, New York, 1993, p. 6.

7. Ibid., p. 4.

8. Ibid., pp. 1-8.

9. British American Security Information Council’s Project ‘Light Weapon Manufacture in the Public and Private Sectors: A View from Pakistan’, Mimeo, London, 1996, p. 4.

10. Ibid., p. 6

11. Chris Smith, ‘Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia’, in Jeffery Boutwell (ed.), Lethal Commerce, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 62-64.

12. Ibid., pp. 62-64.

13. Ibid., p. 63.

14. British American Security Information Council’s project, op cit.

15. Jaswant Singh, op cit.

16. ‘India Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir’ Human Rights Watch Arms Project 6(10), Washington, 1994, pp. 1-54.

17. Jasjit Singh, ‘Light Weapons and Conflict in South Asia’, in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Light Weapons and International Security, Delhi, 1995, pp. 50-55.

18. Chris Smith, op cit, 1995, p. 69.

19. ‘India – Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir’, op cit., p. 3.

20. UN Expert Committee Report on Small Arms, Strategic Digest 28(1), January 1998, p. 3.