The problem
THE ongoing conflict between Indian troops and Pakistan backed intruders in the Kargil sector along the northern reaches of the Line of Control in Kashmir is a localised battle though far more intense than a classic low-intensity conflict. Islamabad’s desire for dangerous brinkmanship appears to be the biggest driving force behind this latest Pakistani initiative to draw international attention to the Kashmir issue. But the conflict in Kargil also carries the ingredients of a low intensity conflict, because it is localised with India’s regular troops battling a mix band of Pakistani backed intruders who have all the necessary external support – in the form of sancturies, weapons, fianacial assistance and even regular troops – to revive the Pakistani led, lost rebellion in the Kashmir Valley. The message for India is clear, that Pakistan cannot shed its obsession for Kashmir, and therefore the relationship between India and its neighbouring state will remain conflict ridden.
Infact, state-making, through much of history, has been a violent act. Many developing (Third World) states are still in the process of setting up a ‘national state’ – as a concept quite distant from the nation state – and in the process are attempting to simultaneously undertake democratic politicisation and industrialisation. Their efforts are hampered by the ‘constraints of time’, having to achieve in decades what the developed world has achieved over centuries. A shorter period for political growth, coupled with the might of the western-industrialised world, as well as the post-War established norms of international behaviour, has made all the later entrants into the international community (sometimes dubbed as ‘the weak intruder majority’) extremely vulnerable.
The state, as we know it, is being threatened on two fronts: from above, by the vast and expanding influence of supra-national agencies, prepared to interact beyond internationally recognized borders; and from below, by a growing tide of secessionism and separatism. In addition, the world is witnessing an alarming proliferation of conflicts – often categorized as low-in-intensity. Such conflicts are becoming extremely destructive, increasingly difficult to contain, and are providing an altogether new dimension to military strategy, which in its classical sense had hitherto focused largely on manoeuvre warfare.1
In recent years South Asia – a distinct political and geographical entity – has faced precisely such predicaments. Although its various parts were brought together in recent history under British rule, they later broke up as British influence declined leading to the partition of India in 1947. India’s regional centrality in both geographical and in power potential terms is axiomatic, accounting for the ‘Indo-centric’ character of the region. This despite the presence of Pakistan and Bangladesh – two relatively large states, as also a collection of smaller states such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives.2 Thus, India’s security policy has a great bearing on the policies of its neighbours, accentuating South Asia’s dilemma of ‘nationhood’ and ‘neighbourhood’ and necessitates, as Nancy Jetley observes, ‘the maintenance of a delicate balance between the demands of India’s strategic security and the legitimate nationalist aspirations of its neighbours.’3
India witnessed a considerable rise in ethno-religious conflicts and separatism. With modernisation and development one had hoped that such conflicts would probably be things of the past. However, instead of witnessing their reduction, governments (such as that of India) are now being required to choose between integrationist – a strong centre controlling the outlying regions, and accommodationist models – a centre that accommodates the various minority communities, instilling pride in their ethnicity and advancing their politico-economic interests.4 The Indian concept of national security consequently has undergone a change, broadening to include the problems of internal violence and political turmoil, resulting in the merging of internal and external security decision-making bodies to cope with the strategic challenges to the unity of India and to the professionalism of its armed forces.
The Indian Army is not entirely unexposed to the pressures of low-intensity warfare. It has the prolonged experience of combating ‘low-key’ insurgencies in India’s remote North East (for about three decades) as well for about nine months in (the erstwhile)East Pakistan, prior to its liberation as Bangladesh. South Asia’s contemporary low-intensity conflicts have added a new dimension to India’s military commitments. The ‘Indo-centric’ character of South Asia, and the occurrence of these conflicts in our border states (of the North East, Punjab and Kashmir), as well as in neighbouring Sri Lanka, has obvious implications for both India’s domestic and foreign policies, and for the region as a whole.
India’s experiences are, however, a part of a growing international phenomenon. An examination of their origins, conduct and implications highlights the challenges that have stretched the Indian government and its powerful military machine to its limits – combining politics with force, internal threats with external, and the power of armies against the power of ideas. The message for the future seems clear – the military must ‘adapt’. The proliferation of such low intensity conflicts has left even the large and powerful Indian army with inadequate margins for what Frank Kitson has observed as, ‘a certain amount of clumsiness to be compensated for by sheer weight in numbers.’5
The term low-intensity conflict (LIC) has emerged only in recent decades, with US Pentagon’s description of ‘the spectrum of conflict’ consisting of ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ intensity levels.6 Conflicts in the ‘high’ category would involve a major conventional war with the possible use of mass-destruction (nuclear) weapons in the final stages (such as in World War II). ‘Medium’ level conflicts would consist of a conventional war between two or more states (such as the Arab-Israeli and the Indo-Pakistan wars). Low-intensity conflicts include insurgencies, guerrilla wars, terrorism, their counter measures, and peacekeeping duties. These essentially involve regular forces on one side and (in most cases) irregulars on the other. Such conflicts, if left unchecked, can prove extremely destructive to one and all, and if confronted unsystematically, can escalate into a higher intensity threat.7
Contemporary warfare has begun to lean extensively towards the ‘low-intensity’ variety. Since 1945, the world has seen around 160 conflicts – of which three fourths have been low-in-intensity. During the post-War period the failure of some of the world’s most powerful military machines against bands of irregulars has continued to shock military analysts. The American military prefers not to mention its short-comings in Vietnam; as the Soviet army staggered back from Afghanistan, they were jeered by a motley collection of mujahideen guerrillas who did not even bother to shoot at them. The Israeli Army, considered amongst the world’s best – was finally pushed back from Lebanon by young boys using mostly sticks and stones to counter their awesome weaponry; and the Indian Army suffered more casualties in Sri Lanka than it did in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, only to be recalled back from the Island which still remains embroiled in a bitter ethnic conflict the Indians had attempted to resolve.8
In the past three centuries or so the nation state has emerged as the central feature of Europe, and thereafter, of world politics. Carl von Clausewitz in his masterpiece Vom Kriege (On War) had elaborated on what he considered as the trinity of modern conflicts – i.e., the state, its people and its armed forces.9 For Clausewitz, war was ‘nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means.’ This, as Michael Howard has observed was ‘the main theme of his entire work’, and ‘the essence of his thought’.10 Human societies have developed their trinitarian structures – of governments, people and their armed forces – to fight the external threat from societies with similar organisations. However, with the present day proliferation of low-intensity conflicts and their ill-defined zones of conduct – the government and their armed forces are now, more often than ever before, pitted against their own people. And as the legitimacy of governments is being undermined by secessionism, Clausewitz’s trinity now stands severely divided within itself.
Most observers are of the opinion that the phenomenon of low-intensity conflicts occurs mostly in the Third World countries – primarily in those nations in the process of modernisation with a plethora of political, social and economic problems. These conflicts have some major characteristics. Sam Sarkesian states that ‘(a) they tend to be asymmetrical – for the revolutionary and the guerrillas the struggle is total one as compared to the government and its forces, for whom it is limited; (b) such conflicts are ambiguous, making it hard to differentiate a friend from a foe; (c) they are fought unconventionally using political and psychological means and methods; and (d) low-intensity conflicts often develop into protracted wars of attrition.11 Martin van Creveld observes that not only do they tend to unfold in the ‘less developed’ parts of the world, but very rarely do they involve regular armies on both sides – often it is a question of regulars on one side fighting guerrillas, terrorists and even civilians, including women and children on the other.12
However, the most comprehensive definition of LIC is the one approved by the US President in a National Security Decision Directive, which defines LIC as a ‘political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition between states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflicts range from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localised, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.’13
The Indian military commitments in the past decade or more seem to reflect precisely such characteristics. More importantly these have created distinct regional security concerns, which could in turn even have global implications. An India bordering on anomie with insurgencies in its peripheral areas, creates not only the danger of regional destabilisation with ‘spill-over’ effects, but more importantly, may amount to India resorting to military ‘solutions’ to resolve its domestic turmoil which it has repeatedly accused its neighbours of instigating.14 The possibility of such ‘solutions’ escalating into a nuclear conflict (with both India and Pakistan now being regarded as de facto nuclear weapon holding states), will have obvious global implications.
And it is this concern, that any escalation in the Indo-Pak fighting along the Line of Control in the Kargil sector could lead to another war and that in turn could tempt the use of nuclear weapons, that drove the powerful G-8 nations to term the Pakistani adventure in Kargil as ‘irresponsible’ this summer. Islamabad’s attempts to draw international attention for a mediation over Kashmir, following its failed intiative in the Valley, for the moment at least, has few backers in the big league.
MAROOF RAZA
Footnotes
1. Martin van Creveld, On Future War, Brasseys, London, 1991.
2. M.B. Phadnis (ed.), Domestic Conflicts in South Asia – Political Dimensions, South Asia Publishers, Delhi, 1986, p. 66.
3. Ibid., p. xv.
4. Ibid., p. 19
5. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, Faber and Faber, London, 1971, p. 1.
6. Klare and Kornbluh (eds.), Low Intensity Warfare, Pantheon Books, New York, 1988, p. 6.
7. Charters and Tugwell (eds.), Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict, Brasseys, London, 1989, p. 252.
8. Martin van Creveld, op cit., pp. 20-25.
9. Ibid., pp. 40, 194.
10. Michael Howard in Butterfield and Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1966, p. 193.
11. Sam Sarkesian, America’s Forgotten Wars, Greenwood Press, London, 1984, pp. 237-239.
12. Martin van Creveld, op cit., p. 20.
13. US Declaration for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Test Publication), October 1990.
14. General Sundarji wrote in India Today, 30 November 1991, that ‘Pakistan’s propping up of Kashmiri insurgency and dabbling in the Khalistan movement will very likely lead to (its) break-up, if India retaliates…’
