OVER the last forty years or more, insurgencies in the North East have generally remained under control with frequent periods of escalation and abatement. Except for the Mizo insurgency, however, none of the others are anywhere near resolution. With the passage of time they have developed graver dimensions and complexity. The impression that they have been permitted to linger on for parochial, political, ethnic and material gains is well-founded and is primarily responsible for the negative response of the local people. But is it insurgency or alienation? Though essentially a political problem, negotiations with the insurgents is unlikely to lead to resolution as the people’s problem is deprivation and not insurgency.

The situation post the Shillong Accord has developed new complexities due to the ethnic divide and conflicts, and the well-entrenched nexus between politicians, bureaucrats and insurgents, who exploit both the ballot and bullet for perpetuating their power. The instability in the region has created a conducive environment for transborder interference and influence giving the insurgency a new dimension. Any solution must take all this into account.

That the North East insurgents were never strong on ideology is well proved by their shifting stand, frequent negotiations and accords, the splintering of most insurgent movements and their tendency to seek out political patronage. While tactically favouring anti-establishment stances and using the ethnic card to gain and maintain support among the people, their core is separatist by nature. Their resilience owes more on the failure of the state to win over the people and marginalise the insurgents and the strong overground vested interest in keeping insurgency alive. This has also led to a disorientation of the insurgent movements and an increasing tendency of indulging in criminal acts of partisan and ethnic killings, extortion, drug trafficking and succumbing to moral and material corruption, particularly easy money.

In the absence of an ideology, insurgents – political representatives, community leaders and the youth – have exploited heightened ethnic feelings, the ‘foreigner’s’ issue, as well as other regional and local issues to gain relevance and power. Unfortunately, our central leaders have also manipulated local bosses to acquire political patronage and power; in some cases even instigated insurgent groups in Manipur, Tripura and Assam, thereby giving an indirect boost to insurgency.

 

 

The splintering and mushrooming of insurgent groups is the outcome of a ‘fear and favour’ complex which has been perpetuated in the region. The failure of the state to provide protection to smaller ethnic groups has resulted in their seeking self protection by forming their own militant groups – the latest being the Zoumi Reunification Organization, active in Manipur against Kuki domination and harassment. The favour and patronage extended to NSCN (IM) by Naga politicians and the feeling of insecurity experienced by the Kukis has resulted in the formation of Kuki militant organisations.

Meitei extremists in Manipur, similarly, are organised in over half a dozen groups, the prominent ones being UNLF, PLA and PREPAK, each with their own patrons. The patronage of Muslim immigrants (Bangladeshi, erstwhile East Bengal and East Pakistan) before Independence and later on as well by Assamese Muslim leaders, is no secret. As a fallout of the Assam agitation, the Pangal-Meitei riots in Manipur and the ISI designs in the region, Muslim fundamentalist organizations with militant off-shoots have now come up in the North East, particularly in Assam and the Siliguri corridor.

The support extended by Naga politicians of Manipur and Nagaland to different factions of the NSCN, NNC and NFG is well-known and needs no elaboration. Over a period of time these mutually beneficial patronage relationships have developed vested interests to continue the status quo. While they condemn the Centre for neglect, their hunger to grab central funds is growing day by day. The local leadership has become Janus faced, with one look for Delhi and the other for local consumption.

Extortion by regional bosses and denial of resources for development constitute the twin banks within which our policy gets articulated. There is a general tendency to pump in more money when under pressure to meet the requirements of political expediency. The political leaders and bureaucrats use their offices to siphon-off developmental funds at the cost of real development. Since 1981, more than Rs 30,000 crore has been pumped into Nagaland, with little to show in terms of development for the people in agriculture, health, education or civic services. Modern buildings – some finished and others unfinished, both government and private – stand as sole testimony to this expenditure; this is where the opportunities for making money have been.

 

 

Corruption and seeking power through use of money and guns and narrow ethnic loyalties has resulted in most politicians and insurgents being motivated and propelled by narrow parochial gains. It appears that insurgency in the North East has become an industry in which the main motive is profit for those in power, both through the ballot and bullet. In this struggle the common people continue to remain poor and the security forces become the ‘fall guys’ for the trinity – politicians, insurgents and people. Despite episodic noises against the security forces, all of them want the presence of the SF so as to survive against each other.

Most of the accords in the North East, except the Mizoram Accord of 1986, have become milestones of discord since these were the outcome of political expediency and were not intended for implementation. They lacked credibility, sincerity and political will as also the machinery for implementation. Such political arrangements create widespread disillusionment and provide still another excuse for the mobilisation of ethnic groups by local politicians and insurgents.

 

 

Most people agree that the factors of isolation, modernisation, ethno-nationalism and cultural insecurity have cumulatively created the effect of deprivation. Therefore, unless the sense of deprivation is eliminated and common man’s aspirations fulfilled, the dynamics of the situation will not permit a solution. Even this sense of deprivation has its stronger and lighter shades which we need to recognise. For instance, Naga insurgency from the very beginning was rooted in a feeling of being separate with no binding political, cultural and economic links with their neighboring communities who were closer to the centre of administration. With the exit of the British, this link was severed and gave birth to the idea of independence. Unfortunately, while independent India did establish political and economic links, it failed in fostering emotional links with the region.

The Mizos, who were the first to declare their unconditional joining with India, felt cheated when our response to the ’60s famine was not only tardy but, in their perception, deliberately mismanaged. Though they have largely overcome this feeling it continues to resurface at times of crisis when Mizoram feels constrained due to its geographical location. One such instance was in 1994 when the inability of the Central government to resolve the face-off between Assam and Mizoram resulted in an acute scarcity of rice. Ultimately the chief minister had to import rice from Myanmar.

The Meiteis of Manipur feel deprived in comparision to the other tribal communities in the state, who received extra benefits due to the policy of protection. To some extent I rectified this when the Meiteis were included in the obc list in 1994. Both the Assamese and Bodo militancy in Assam is due to a heightened feeling of relative deprivation. Tribal insurgency in Tripura is a result of deprivation due to demographic and social imbalances.

 

 

The paradigms of conflict resolution and management relevant to the situation in the North East are idealpolitik, a cooperative approach and identification of key factors for interaction and escalation of conflicts as they have relevance for conflict resolution and management. However, before discussing these, it would be relevant to reiterate the nature of the conflicts in the North East.

The conflicts in the North East centre around human frustrations borne out of deprivations of various types and the absence of an effective channel for their political articulation. Threat and violation of the need for security in the socio-economic field, and the question of identity has generated ethnic-centrism primarily due to a perverted political ethos. Aggression and violence is a manifestation of these frustrations. It is also important to keep in mind the background of insurgencies and the genesis of ferment, as these highlight the factors which initiated and contributed to an escalation of the conflicts at various points of time. This would help in understanding them and taking remedial action.

The two selected paradigms of idealpolitik and a cooperative approach must go together as they are complimentary. However, before discussing them, it would be relevant to clarify certain perceptional issues. The present environment in the country is dominated by realpolitik and cutthroat competition. It is the same, if not worse, in the North East. Experts often argue that the real world of politics cannot be changed and therefore we must look elsewhere for solutions. I am afraid such a perception is dangerous and will only lead to disaster as it encourages a confrontational course which is power-based, adversarial and promotes a win or loose approach to conflict resolution. We cannot talk of peace and a political solution while persisting with policies of realpolitik – these are contradictory and confrontationist. We must change our mindset and start veering towards idealpolitik, which aims at changing the environment for the better.

 

 

The beginning of any idealpolitik solution is in the minds of the policy-makers. They need to understand the causes of people’s frustration and demonstrate a willingness to work towards removing them. Just understanding and acknowledging is not enough, we have to do something about it. Our failure has been that despite understanding and acknowledging these causes we fall prey to compulsions of realpolitik. Consequently, the solutions never get properly implemented despite the vast resources pumped in. I am not arguing against evolving an effective response to violence. I believe that though the response to violence has to be both effective and well-directed, we should simultaneously bring about changes in the political, social, economic and other systems to eliminate the causes and conditions responsible for the conflicts. The absence of an effective response in the political, social and economic spheres is the main cause for our failure.

 

 

The other issue is one of orientation or focus of our policy of idealpolitik and cooperative response. Since the core issue is one of deprivation and it entirely relates to the people and the common man, the focus has to be the people. In all our endeavours so far the focus has been on politics and thereby on the politicians and the insurgent groups whose orientation is entirely on political issues and power which does not take into account the deprivation of the people. Therefore, no solution arrived at can be lasting; if anything it will create new conflicts. My experience in the North East, particularly in Manipur, has proved beyond doubt that only idealpolitik which focuses on the people’s deprivations can resolve the problem.

The realpolitical solution as defined above, based on the principles of idealpolitik and a cooperative approach, does find wide acceptance. It is, however, difficult to implement because of the distortions in our political system caused by vested interests. Its implementation requires good governance oriented entirely to removing people’s sense of deprivation and alienation. That is the cement which can bind the policy framework of idealpolitik and a cooperative approach to conflict resolution and better management of conflicts; both are essential and one cannot succeed without the other.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the basis of a solution for the conflicts in the North East lie in idealpolitik and a cooperative approach, we should now attempt to draw out the parameters of a solution. At this stage it will also be pertinent to acknowledge that the ongoing conflicts are armed insurgencies which draw people’s support essentially due to their ethnic links with the insurgents as also a sense of deprivation, wherein the insurgents are seen as representing their frustrations. There is also an element of external support in the shape of sanctuaries and material and moral support. Therefore, any solution must take all these factors into account.

By virtue of its location, the North East is characterised by socio-political instability and economic backwardness. Isolation and inaccessibility continue to influence perceptions and undermine stability. The continuous inflow of immigrants, rising socio-economic aspirations, growing land alienation and lack of infrastructure have all contributed to retarding the process of development and integration. The extension of administration to the peripheral area of the North East was viewed with suspicion and interpreted as interference in their traditional systems, resulting in revival of the traditional centres of power for mobilisation of people. The situation was only compounded by the distorted political ethos, corruption and maladministration.

 

 

The shift in the policy from realpolitik to that of idealpolitik must be gradual, sustained and visible as the system at all levels has been subverted over a long period of time. This shift can take place only if there is the requisite political will; merely good intentions and rhetorics will not do. A consensus must develop in the polity that these are national problems and therefore petty politics should be kept out. The change to create a policy framework has to start at the top while implementation must go from bottom upwards so that the public feels the impact, participates in it and provide the necessary legitimacy and boost to the change. It is only with political will, backed by public pressure that the administrative machinery, which has become lethargic, insensitive and corrupt, can be rejuvenated.

 

 

The foundation of a shift to idealpolitik should be laid on a declared policy of establishing legitimacy, credibility and transparency in government functioning. The absence of a declared policy has resulted in disjointed, inconsistent and motivated responses, both by the politicians and bureaucrats. It has contributed to expediency and tardy execution. In the economic and developmental field it has resulted in a disorientation and circumvention of the system, resulting in malpractices and corruption. Unless there is the fusion of a well-defined and credible policy based on correct inputs, political will and an efficient and responsible machinery to implement it, success will be elusive. As discussed earlier, the key lies in economic development and security of the people.

Our approach to security management should be in keeping with the overall strategy of idealpolitik and a cooperative approach as outlined. I consider security and effectiveness, along with securing the environment and control of the area, as the key factors for efficient conflict management, which in the long run will contribute to conflict resolution.

Effectiveness and security are key result areas for the administration and security forces. Security embraces all aspects of public life and should be understood and implemented in all its connotations of physical, economic, social, ethnic and religious security. Similarly, effectiveness does not only mean physical effectiveness; it encompasses positive contributions by the government and all its instruments to the economic, religious, cultural and social well-being of the people. A guiding principle in securing the environment is that you cannot be secure unless you are effective. In any disturbed environment, physical security and effectiveness are the foundations on which interventions in other fields are built up; it cannot be otherwise.

 

 

Securing the environment is the entire canvas of which anti-insurgent operations are only a part. The foundations of securing the environment and all military operations are laid through controlling the area. Control of the area of responsibility of one’s command is the key to success in an insurgency affected environment. Without control neither can one gather intelligence, nor can anti-insurgent operations by security forces and counter measures by administration succeed. The word ‘control’ should not be understood in its restricted or defensive sense; it means total domination of the area whereby security forces and administration provide protection to the population, are aware of all happenings and can predict, forestall and influence events in every field of activity. The essence of control can be summed up as, ‘Nothing can happen in the area without our knowledge and without our being aware of it in time to counter and influence it.’

A crisis of credibility is fast emerging in the North East as people’s alienation is coalescing into a sentiment of negative responses to the government and its instruments. The primary reason for this state of affairs is the tendency of political expediency, resulting in instability and bad governance. The major manifestations of this are a denial of resources to the people and the exploitation of ethnic and local sentiment by local leaders for parochial and selfish purposes. Together they provide impetus to insurgency.