ALTHOUGH unconventional weapons of terror have not yet been used in India, this possibility cannot be ruled out in the future. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of a nuclear, chemical, or biological nature, along with cyber-warfare, can well become the major tools of terror tomorrow. This is the result of greater technological expertise and awareness among terrorist/insurgent groups, the vast dissemination of information on unconventional weapons on the internet, and the increasing availability of such weapons from within the country as well as abroad.

Clearly, the prime factor will be the ability of the terrorist/insurgent groups to obtain the requisite raw materials and then build a weapon of use. The dramatic rise in the number of countries in possession of unconventional weapons, as well as those actively engaged in their development, makes such a scenario possible. The disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991 has already resulted in much publicised problems of control over nuclear materials and facilities. The presence of nuclear and chemical weapons in both India and Pakistan also makes it imperative that controls over them are strictly enforced, as they could well be the target of terrorist/insurgent groups.

The erstwhile Soviet Union continues to be the major source for the covert transfer of weapons-usable fissile material, as evidenced by seizures of nuclear material. Since 1992, this has included three kgs of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the Czech Republic, nearly three kgs in St. Petersburg, over a kg near Moscow, and two kgs in Lithuania. In addition, three seizures of plutonium and one of HEU in Germany (all in gramme quantities or less) have been made. These seizures are believed to represent merely the tip of the iceberg. Western intelligence sources indicate that the amount of clandestine weapons grade plutonium available today for sale in the black markets of the West is sufficient to make at least two nuclear weapons.

Moreover, in a startling disclosure, General Alexander Lebed, a former National Security Advisor to President Yeltsin, alleged that upto a hundred portable bombs made up to look like suitcases, have been unaccounted for since 1992. These ‘suitcase bombs’ have an explosive capacity of one kilotonne (the equivalent of 1,000 tonnes of TNT), and can be activated by a single individual.

These allegations have been substantiated by a respected Russian scientist, Alexei Yablokov, who stated that these nuclear bombs were secretly developed under orders from the erstwhile Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, in the 1970s for terrorist purposes. While these claims do appear exaggerated, it is apparent that such ‘miniaturised’ nuclear weapons have actually been built. Amidst the confusion within the erstwhile Soviet Union in the early 1990s, it is quite possible that the whereabouts of some of these suitcase bombs may not be known.

A recent report has also alleged that as much as two-and-a-half tonnes of plutonium has been ‘lost’ from American nuclear weapon laboratories over the years. This includes 1.25 tonnes of plutonium unaccounted for from the Rocky Flats weapons factory near Denver, Colorado. The U.S. Department of Energy, which controls U.S. nuclear weapon stockpiles, insists that none of this fissile material has been stolen but is simply missing due to ‘inventory differences’ stemming from the material sticking to pipes and manufacturing tools. However, a U.S. Department of Energy report in May 1999 rated security at three prominent nuclear weapons installations – Los Almos, Lawrence Livermore, and Oak Ridge – as ‘marginal’, providing only ‘questionable assurance’ that the material was safeguarded closely enough.

Not only could Russian ‘suitcase bombs’ and/or American nuclear material find their way to Pakistan, but Pakistan’s own nuclear weapon establishments could well become a source of fissile material for terrorists to target India’s population centres. They may well be aided in this task by its powerful Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The possibility of a breach in security at one of India’s nuclear and weapon facilities also needs to be taken into account.

Currently, fissile material in India is available from its six nuclear reactors at Kakrapar (Gujarat), Kalpakkam (Tamilnadu), and Narora (Uttar Pradesh), as well as five research and test reactors at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) at Mumbai, and the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) at Kalpakkam. It is well known that the most difficult and expensive part of building a crude nuclear bomb is the acquisition of sufficient fissile material, not the actual assembly of the weapon. The ease by which nuclear weapons could then be made is acknowledged worldwide.

A panel of five former U.S. nuclear weapons designers recently reported to the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism that a workable nuclear bomb ‘could be constructed by a group not previously engaged in designing or building nuclear weapons provided a number of requirements were adequately met,’ as also that such a crude design could produce a nominal yield in the 10 kilotonne range. Even if the bomb did not achieve its full yield because of design flaws, ‘the lowest pre-initiation yield may still be in the 100 tonne range, even in a crude design.’

Moreover, the actual building of a nuclear bomb may not even be required. The availability of a small amount of plutonium (not even weapons grade), for example, would be sufficient to threaten or carry out the contamination of a country’s natural resources, resulting in large numbers of human casualties. The central water supply system of a major city would clearly be the ideal choice for such devastating contamination. Since plutonium is highly toxic by nature, even one microgramme of the substance would suffice to wreak havoc. Placed strategically in the drinking water supply, it would gradually kill hundreds and thousands of people and, more important from a terrorist’s point of view, create an environment of absolute fear. The scattering of plutonium in the air would not be as effective as the contamination of water. Terrorists/insurgents in India could well be assisted in such an act of terror by the intelligence and security agencies of hostile states.

Chemical and biological weapons are, not surprisingly, called the ‘poor man’s atomic bomb.’ They require precursors and technologies readily available, not the acquisition of fissile material. They are difficult to detect and easy to deploy in delivery systems ranging from soda bottles to rudimentary rockets. Once the chemicals, for example, are enclosed in a container there is absolutely no method available today by which it is possible to determine its contents.

The final advantage, in a very macabre sense, is their efficiency; causing numerous casualties at minimal financial costs. According to a web page at Arizona State University, atomic bombs cost approximately $2000 per casualty and conventional weapons $800 per casualty. In comparison, costs for chemical weapons are $600 per casualty and for biological weapons about $1 per casualty.

Tools of chemical warfare include nerve agents such as tabun, sarin and soman; vesicants such as sulphur mustard, cyanide (solid salts and volatile liquids); pulmonary agents such as phosgene (carbonyl chloride) and incapacitating agents such as BZ. Whereas some cause death quickly (nerve agents and cyanide), the effects of others (sulphur mustard and pulmonary agents) begin hours after exposure. Their effects are also quite different. Whereas sarin affects the nervous system through penetration of the skin or vapour, vesicant agents cause severe blistering of the skin as well as damage to the eyes and airways. The required quantities for lethal effects also vary considerably; large amounts of cyanide are required to cause death, in comparison to the amount needed for nerve agents.

Incidents of chemical terrorism have taken place already. The first such officially acknowledged attack was carried out by an obscure Japanese religious sect, the Aum Shinri Kyo (‘Supreme Truth’), in the Tokyo subway on 20 March 1995. On that day, a number of small containers were placed on five trains running on three major lines of the subway system, scheduled to arrive at the Kasumi-gaseki station within four minutes of each other at the height of the morning rush hour. These containers were filled with a type of binary chemical weapon in which the constituent elements of sarin were brought together to form the poisonous gas just prior to release (by the breaking of the container). As a result, the gas spread through the trains, leaving a final toll of 12 dead and over 5,500 injured. What surprised chemical warfare experts was that the death toll was not higher. It is believed that had an effective aerosol delivery system been used, there would have been at least 300 or more people dead.

In the wake of the Tokyo attack it was realised that earlier incidents of sarin poisoning or contamination were also carried out by the same sect. The most significant of these took place in the mountain resort of Matsumoto, 125 miles northwest of Tokyo, late in the evening of 27 June 1994. A substance, later identified as sarin, had seeped through the open windows of apartments and houses, killing or injuring everyone within a confined area of space. As a result, seven people had died and some 264 sought hospital treatment.

Closer home, it was reported in 1986 that Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka had threatened to poison the country’s tea crop. An identical situation was publicised in September 1994, when the Sri Lankan Tea Board announced that threats to poison exports of tea had been proven a hoax. A Tamil group called the Ellalan Force had claimed in faxes to news agencies, foreign embassies and trade associations that it had mixed arsenic in tea bags destined for export. Subsequently, the U.S., Germany and Italy were reported to have checked their imports of tea from Sri Lanka. However, while calling for precautionary measures and tightened security, the Sri Lankan Tea Board was unable to find any trace of arsenic in 200 random samples tested over a two week period.

Chemical warfare agents can readily be synthesized by a skilled chemist if the precursors are available. The processes for synthesis are readily available and can even be downloaded from the internet. This does not require the resources or the technical assistance of a state. Much or all of the necessary production equipment and technology is available on the open market and has widespread civil utility. Although there has been an international embargo on many of these precursors, this ban does not apply to shipments within a country. The U.S. Department of Defence estimates that as many as 26 states may possess chemical agents, and/or weapons and an additional 12 may be seeking to develop them. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), India formally acknowledged the presence of chemical weapons in the country.

Biological weapons carry agents which spread deadly diseases like anthrax and plague. These agents comprise bacterias which cause anthrax, bubonic plague, brucellosis and tularemia; rickettsiae which causes Q-fever; viruses like encephalitis; and toxins like botulinum and saxitoxin. These diseases cause considerable damage when they penetrate the skin or are inhaled, often resulting in death.

It was not surprising to learn that the Japanese Aum Shinri Kyo sect had been interested in biological terrorism. In 1993, its members are believed to have visited a major research institute in Japan to purchase materials necessary for gene recombination and cells for promoting the multiplication of viruses. Worse, the sect appeared interested in the deadly Ebola virus. It reportedly sent a ‘medical’ mission to Zaire in 1992 at the time of an outbreak of the virus.

Recently, a comprehensive study on the spread of bioterrorism and bio-crimes was released in the U.S. Written by W. Seth Carus, a visiting fellow at Washington’s National Defence University’s Centre for Counter Proliferation Research, it cites more than 110 alleged cases involving biological agents this century. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that at least ten countries are believed to possess or be conducting research on biological agents for weaponization. According to the U.S. Department of Defence, ‘Pakistan has the resources and the capabilities appropriate to conducting R&D relating to biological weapons.’ Still believed unaccounted for in Iraq are 30 tonnes of biological weapon agents, including 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of anthrax, and 2 tonnes of aflatoxins.

Highly sophisticated and far more dangerous biological weapons could also be made from recent advances in biotechnological research, which attempts to map the human gene. Such weapons could be capable of targetting a specific group of human beings with common genetic characteristics, as may be the case with certain ethnic groups. This terrifying prospect may well be a spin-off from research being carried out under the Human Genome Project (HGP), a 15-year $3 billion programme begun in 1990. This international scientific effort aims to map and sequence all the 60,000 to 80,000 genes in the human body to find out more about human DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid).

The information age has truly dawned upon us. In defence planning, for example, information technology (IT) assets and capabilities (including computers and communication networks) have brought about a revolution in military affairs (RMA). This connectivity, however, can be exploited by cyber-terrorists to destroy critical sections of the information highway. The use of non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NN-EMP) ‘suitcase bombs’, for example, would have devastating electronic consequences against military and civilian communication networks. They could also destroy smart ammunition, as well as influence mines and missile warheads.

In addition, cyber-terrorism could be conducted by introducing lethal computer viruses into communication networks, overwhelming the system with an information overload, cracking encrypted communication, and hacking into official civil and military computers, including those used for tasks such as air traffic control (both military and civilian). Such incidents would wreak considerable havoc and casualties.

Following the Pokhran II nuclear tests in May 1998, it was feared that BARC’s communication network had been tampered with. However, only the external e-mails of BARC scientists had been contaminated by a group of dedicated hackers opposed to nuclear weapons. Recently, the Indian Army’s official website on Kashmir was also hacked into, and its contents altered.

Clearly, the age of unconventional terror is upon us. Raw materials are not impossible to acquire from national stocks or covert transactions in the international black market, nor is it difficult to actually build fairly effective and deployable weapons for purposes of terrorism. The March 1995 attack in the Tokyo subway represents the first such major example of chemical terrorism. The use of fissile material, chemical and biological weapons, and even cyber space, for acts of terror in the future is a distinct possibility in India.

This necessitates enhanced and comprehensive security at India’s nuclear and weapon establishments and facilities, and exchanges of information and analysis with intelligence services of friendly states. In addition, agencies of the government need to be trained and to prepare themselves to deal with such acts of unconventional terror in the near future.