Backpage

THE fear of an escalated conflict, possibly even war, has overshadowed everything else. No matter how often our defence experts reassure us that what we are facing is another, though more serious, low intensity conflict, a ‘war-like’ situation, the arguments, so far, do not cut much ice. Witness the emptying out of villages on the Punjab border.

It has now been admitted that over the last few months hundreds of trained personnel, not just mercenaries and mujahideen but regulars of the Pakistan Army, moved across the loc and occupied crucial heights overlooking the Srinagar-Leh highway. This when the government was busy highlighting the ‘success’ of its 13 month rule (including the much hyped bus diplomacy) or settling debates about restrictions on categories of citizenship. The implications are obvious; the failure of intelligence massive.

As reports of losses mount and a feeling of betrayal deepens, intransigence has crept in and cries for a decisive battle have started gaining strength. On one side are ranged those who are convinced that Pakistan is playing out its pre-ordained role of carrying forward the logic of Partition. There is also the army, shaken by losses, upset at the ‘games’ civilian leadership – both political and bureaucratic – continues to play, and which knows that without a concerted military move not only will securing the Kargil heights prove difficult, but that a similar incursion can take place elsewhere, anytime in the future. Consequently, the advice to rethink our position on the loc, even open up another front a la 1971.

Partly, the fact that our diplomatic initiatives – the telephonic conversation with Bill Clinton resulting in stronger statements by the U.S. and the g-8, the visit of Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh to China, presenting proof of Pakistani involvement to the world community – while welcome, are seen as insufficient to rein in Pakistan despite categorical condemnation by Germany, tilt the scales towards a military solution. Few believe that the tough message delivered to Sartaj Aziz or the efforts to drive a wedge between the Pakistani political and military leadership can succeed.

Though saner elements hope that the current conflict will not spill over, compulsions of realpolitik on both sides of the border could prove them wrong. The government, keen to make up for what was a glaring failure of intelligence, cannot afford to lose the symbolic battle as the true defender of national security. Not that our opposition, in an election year, is likely to miss an opportunity of embarrassing it. Similarly, since the ante has been pushed up, it will not be easy for Nawaz Sharif to climb down and withdraw his troops.

Even in this scenario of heightened jingoism, we need to ask whether we are really prepared for war. More importantly, will war, even if decisive, solve the problem? At the heart of the current conflict lies Kashmir. All through this phase, no autonomous Kashmir politician, from Shabir Shah and Yasin Malik to a Balraj Puri, has managed to get a word in edgewise. We should by now know that without a creative involvement of the Kashmiri people all we will get is a further hardening of attitudes. That, with both India and Pakistan as a declared nuclear weapon states, only makes the situation more complex.

A search for peace does not imply a reduction in preparedness. Kargil highlights, once again, how we have let our systems decay. For years now the armed forces have suffered a shortage of officers, over 3000 at the last count. Promotions have been questionable. Intra-service disputes, often involving courts, have risen to unacceptable levels. The Bhagwat affair blew the lid off the strained civil-military relationship. The lack of equipment and training remains glaring.

Worse has been the failure of our intelligence agencies and the decision-making system charged with analysing the reports received. How else could we miss the preparations for Kargil or so dramatically misread them? What is the quality of our expertise on even Pakistan, a stated historical adversary? Witness the defence minister’s statement about the nature of the relationship between civilian authority, the army and the intelligence agencies in Pakistan. Can we realistically expect to anticipate if not pre-empt Pakistani moves?

The fear is that in the absence of informed strategic thinking and preparedness what is likely to prevail is the logic of realpolitik. With the army restive and the politicians operating with an eye on the forthcoming elections, voices for peace, diplomacy and political settlement may be squeezed out. The route is open for escalation and tragedy. For once I hope I am wrong.

 

Harsh Sethi